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Abstract
We analyze the evolution and price implications of aggregate sectorial holdings of stocks, 
using detailed information on the universe of publicly traded stocks in the euro area. We 
document that: i) households’ (HH) direct holdings represent a higher fraction of total 
ownership in domestic bank stocks than in non-fi nancial corporation (NFC) stocks; ii) 
HH holdings of stocks increase (decrease) following a decline (increase) in the stock 
price, especially for domestic bank stocks; and iii) an increase in domestic HH holdings 
is followed by future (persistent) increases in the price of NFC stocks, but not for bank 
stocks. Moreover, during equity issuances, an increase in the share of domestic HH 
holdings is followed by a future (persistent) decrease in the stock price of bank stocks, 
but not for NFC stocks. Our results are consistent with HH being liquidity providers in 
the stock market, and at the same time subject to negative information asymmetries. We 
argue that this latter effect is more prevalent in domestic bank stocks than in NFC given 
the close relationships between HH and banks.
Keywords: household ownership, stock prices, equity issuance, banks, non-fi nancial 
corporations, liquidity provision, informational asymmetries. 
JEL classifi cation: G11, G14, G21, G50.
Resumen
Este trabajo analiza la evolución y las implicaciones en el precio de las acciones de las 
tenencias de acciones por parte de distintos sectores. Para ello se utiliza información 
detallada sobre el universo de acciones cotizadas de la zona del euro. Se encuentra lo 
siguiente: i) los hogares cuentan con un mayor peso en el accionariado de los bancos 
que en el de las empresas no fi nancieras; ii) las tenencias de acciones de los hogares 
aumentan (disminuyen) cuando cae (sube) el precio de las acciones, especialmente 
cuando se trata de las acciones de bancos nacionales, y iii) un aumento de las tenencias 
de acciones de los hogares domésticos es seguido por incrementos persistentes del 
precio de las acciones de las empresas, mientras que esto no ocurre para los bancos. 
Además, tras una emisión de acciones, un aumento de la participación de los hogares 
en el accionariado de los bancos es seguido por una caída del precio de estas acciones, 
mientras que esto no ocurre en las empresas. Nuestros resultados sugieren que los 
hogares actúan como proveedores de liquidez en los mercados de acciones, si bien al 
mismo tiempo están sujetos a asimetrías de información. Este último mecanismo puede 
ser más relevante cuando los hogares compran las acciones de los bancos, dadas las 
estrechas relaciones entre las entidades y los hogares.
Palabras clave: participación de los hogares en el mercado de acciones, precio de las 
acciones, emisiones de acciones, bancos, empresas no fi nancieras, provisión de liquidez, 
asimetrías de información.
Códigos JEL: G11, G14, G21, G50.
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1. Introduction 
What are the roles of different sectors when investing in the stock market? Do 
households play a different role in bank than in non-financial corporation stocks? 
Households’ direct holdings of stocks represent a sizeable part of the stock market. 
According to the Securities Holdings Statistics by Sector (SHSS), euro area households’ 
(HH) direct holdings of stocks accounted for 10% of total stock market capitalization of 
euro area firms as of the end of 2017.1 In order to understand the role of HH direct 
investment in the stock market, we analyze (aggregate) trading behavior of HH, and that 
of other sectors, and its implications for future price developments. In doing so we 
highlight the different patterns present in bank stocks with respect to non-financial 
corporations (NFC), as well as between domestic and foreign investors.  
We document that in our sample: (i) bank stocks represent a larger fraction of direct 
holdings for HH than for other market participants, especially for bank stocks with which 
the HH shares residence (domestic); (ii) HH increase their direct holdings after price 
declines in a given stock, especially for domestic bank stocks; (iii) after an increase in 
(domestic) HH direct ownership in a given NFC stock the stock price increases, but bank 
stock prices do not; (iv) in equity issuances, an increase in (domestic) HH direct 
ownership is followed by future price declines in bank stocks, but not in NFC stocks.  
Our interest in HH direct investment is based on two facts. First, HH direct holdings 
are large and, as suggested by recent events (such as the “GameStop short squeeze”, IMF 
(2021)), can have implications in the stock market if the market is not fully efficient. 
Second, HH are a special type of investor when compared to other participants in the 
stock market (institutional investors). HH have different liquidity needs than other 
participants –liquidity channel-, but also have lower financial sophistication -information 
channel–. Given the close relationships that HH have with banks with respect to financial 
investment decisions (as banks have close ties with their clients), we focus on 
documenting the existing differences between HH and other sectors’ trading patterns 
when trading bank versus NFC stocks. These differences allow us to highlight the 
potential frictions that HH face in the stock market, and their aggregate price implications. 
                                                            
1 HH holdings refer to the market value of listed, ordinary stocks of the euro area in HH portfolios. 
To perform our analysis, we use data from the SHSS. This dataset identifies 
aggregate sectorial holdings for each publicly traded security in the euro area on a 
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quarterly basis. One of the advantages is that it identifies aggregate HH direct holdings, 
as well as those of other sectors such as mutual funds (MF), insurance and pension funds 
(IPF), banks or NFC. In doing so it identifies the residence of the holder, allowing us to 
differentiate between domestic and foreign investors for each investor type. To the best 
of our knowledge, this is the first study that, using the universe of holdings of publicly 
traded stocks in Europe for the period 2009-2017, explores the dynamic relationships 
between price developments and aggregate stock holdings of HH and other sectors, and 
documents stark differences between domestic and foreign HH (as well as other sectors) 
when trading bank or NFC stocks. 
Analyzing HH direct holdings and comparing them to other sectors is relevant as 
HH can have a different role than other market participants in the stock market. Previous 
research has shown that HH can play the role of liquidity providers in the stock market 
and invest when prices are low due to liquidity tensions (e.g. Kaniel et al. 2008) –liquidity 
channel-.2 However, HH have also been shown to be less sophisticated and less informed 
than other participants in the stock market (Barber and Odean, 2000 and Barber et al. 
2009) and, hence, can be slower and less efficient in incorporating new information about 
stock fundamentals –information channel-. This latter effect can be more relevant for 
domestic investors, as less sophisticated investors have been shown to have a higher home 
bias (Karlson and Norden 2007). Hence, the information channel can make (domestic) 
HH more prone to buy stocks that, due to a negative information shock which HH do not 
fully incorporate, have a decline in their future price. If such information is not 
instantaneously absorbed in the stock price, it will continue to decline in the future up to 
the moment in which the information is completely incorporated.   
If HH are subject to a (negative) information channel, HH can act not only as 
liquidity providers, buying when the price goes down because of liquidity tensions and 
obtaining positive profits when such tensions cease to exist, but can also be subject to a 
“lemons” problem, buying when the price goes down because some (better informed) 
market participants are receiving negative signals about the stocks’ fundamentals and are 
selling the stock. In such case HH would make a loss on such trade.  
We argue that the close relationship that banks have with their clients (HH), to 
which they offer advice and special conditions if they invest in their own stocks (Hoechle 
                                                            
2 See Timmer (2018) for evidence on how liquidity needs between institutional investors (investment funds 
and pension funds or insurance companies) affect buying or selling debt securities after a price decline.  
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et al. 2018), can make the informational asymmetry higher in bank stocks than in NFC 
stocks. This can be more relevant when bank and holder share nationality, i.e. domestic 
banks, as it is more probable that such investors share a relationship with the bank. 
This study provides evidence consistent with both a liquidity and informational 
channel in HH stock investing. Our evidence suggests that informational asymmetries 
can be especially relevant in the case of domestic bank stocks, which we argue can be 
related to the close relationships between HH and banks in making financial decisions. 
In line with the close relationship that HH and banks have, we document in Section 
2 that the weight of HH direct holdings in bank stocks is higher than in NFC stocks, and 
that this is especially the case when banks and HH share the same residence (domestic 
banks), which we argue is a proxy of the closeness of such relationship. At the end of 
2017 HH direct holdings represented 13.8% of the market capitalization of euro area bank 
stocks, versus 9.6% in the case of NFC stocks. This “bias” towards bank stocks is more 
prominent when we split holdings of the HH sector on the basis of its residence. Direct 
holdings of HH that share residence with the headquarter of banks (exposures of domestic 
HH to domestic banks) represented 13.0% of the market capitalization of the euro banking 
sector as of the end of 2017 (8.7% in the case of NFCs). This percentage falls significantly 
to 0.8% for foreign HH (HH that do not share residence with the bank) and, importantly, 
is similar to holdings of NFC stocks by foreign HH, which is 0.9%. 
After documenting the differences in aggregate stock holdings of different 
(domestic and foreign) sectors, in Section 4 we analyze the aggregate trading patterns of 
HH (and other sectors) following a decline (increase) in stock prices, and their differences 
in bank versus NFC stocks. We also analyze if domestic investors in each given sector 
buy more (or less) stocks after a price decrease than foreign investors in such sector. We 
then analyze in Section 5 if changes in (domestic) HH holdings (or those of any other 
sector) are related to future price changes, studying if there are differences in this 
relationship in bank versus NFC stocks. We analyze both normal times and also periods 
of equity issuances, as such periods are ones of high informational asymmetries between 
the firm and its investors (Myers and Majluf, 1984 and Miller and Rock, 1985). 
Regarding our first set of results, we document that HH, as well as NFC, increase 
(reduce) their holdings in a given stock the quarter after a drop (increase) in the price of 
the stock. On the other hand, institutional investors, mainly MF and banks, reduce 
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(increase) their holdings the quarter after a drop (increase) in the stock price. We find that 
this pattern of HH direct investment is more relevant in bank stocks than in NFC stocks 
and that such pattern is driven by domestic HH and not by foreign HH. In particular, a 
decline of one standard deviation in NFC prices (-15%) leads to a modest increase of 
domestic HH holdings of 0.5%. The change in holdings is five times greater for the same 
shock in bank stock prices. Similarly, we also document the existence of a differential 
behavior of domestic vs foreign NFC holders in the case of bank stocks. Finally, we show 
how the reaction to price decreases by domestic HH and NFC in bank stocks is four times 
larger than to price increases. This is not the case for other sectors such as IPF, MF or 
banks. This result highlights that during periods of negative bank shocks (which translate 
into stock prices declines) there is an increase in the holdings of domestic HH and NFC 
(and not of banks, IPF or MF). 
Concerning our second set of results, we find that an increase in the share of 
domestic HH holdings predicts future permanent increases in NFC stock prices. This 
result is in line with the liquidity provision mechanism present in Kaniel et al. (2008) 
among others. The argument is as follows: HH act as liquidity providers in moments of 
price pressure that drive the stock price down and buy the stock at a depressed price. Once 
the price pressure lifts HH benefit from the reversal of such stock price to its original 
fundamental price. Interestingly, we find that this is not the case in bank stocks, as we 
document that an increase in the share of domestic HH holdings does not predict future 
increases in bank stock prices. This latter result suggests a potential negative information 
channel that domestic HH can be subject to when buying (bank) stocks – information 
channel-. Consistently with domestic HH having a closer link with banks than foreign 
HH, we find that an increase in the share of foreign HH holdings predicts an increase, and 
not a decline, in bank stock prices in the future. 
Finally, in order to further analyze the relevance of the potential negative 
informational asymmetries that HH can be subject to when trading stocks, we study equity 
issuances. We do so as equity issuances are situations in which the asymmetries of 
information between investors and the firm managers can heighten. Our last set of results 
documents that when during an equity issuance of bank stocks the share of domestic HH 
holdings increase, this is followed by future persistent price declines in the following 
quarters. In particular, for follow-on (seasoned) issuances of bank stocks an increase in 
HH holdings of one standard deviation leads to a decline in the price per share of 15% 
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(on average) four quarters after the issuance, and this effect is persistent.3 This finding is 
consistent with HH being less informed than other investors about the underlying reason 
of the equity issuance and, therefore, the underlying quality of the stock -information 
channel-. In this respect, we document that these aforementioned results are only present 
in equity issuances of bank stocks and not in equity issuances of NFC, and only present 
when the increase is in domestic (and not foreign) HH share.  
We end our analysis by performing, in Section 6, several tests that ensure the 
robustness of our results. We first perform our analysis undergoing a seemingly unrelated 
regression, instead of an OLS, procedure. We then restrict our sample to focus only on (i) 
bank and NFC stocks that are of similar (large) market value and (ii) periods in which the 
aggregate price trends of both bank and NFC stocks are also similar. We find that our 
results hold in all these robustness checks. 
Our novel findings highlight the aggregate implications of underlying frictions in the 
stock market. Our study suggests that the HH sector plays a liquidity role in the stock 
market, and at the same time is subject to informational asymmetries, which are larger in 
the case of domestic bank stocks. We argue that this can have non-trivial effects for the 
economy. By providing liquidity in the market, HH can help ameliorate negative feedback 
loops in stock prices. However, this can come at a financial cost for HH if such prices do 
not revert, which we find is more prevalent in bank stocks. Also the fact that domestic 
HH holdings increase during distress situations (stock price declines), and that banks' 
                                                            
3 By focusing on price performance the quarters after the issuance takes place we avoid possible mechanical 
price dilution effects that occur during the quarter in which the issuance takes place.  
equity issuances expose HH to informational asymmetries, can affect regulators’ 
incentives and decision making in relevant ways. 
1.1. Related literature 
This study is related to two strands of research. The first strand of literature comprises 
those studies analyzing the stock trading behaviors of different agents. We contribute to 
this literature by being the first ones that analyze aggregate direct HH stock holdings and 
document the important differences that exist between the buying and selling patters in 
bank and NFC stocks and in domestic and foreign investors of each holder-sector.  
Keniel et al (2008) provides evidence on how individual investors buy stocks 
following price declines in the previous month and how, in doing so, they obtain abnormal 
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returns. They argue that this evidence is consistent with individual investors being risk 
averse and playing a liquidity role in the stock market. Timmer (2018) provides evidence 
on how institutional investors subject to liquidity pressures are more prone to sell bonds 
which are bought by institutions with lower liquidity pressures obtaining a profit in doing 
so. Our results complement the ample literature on trading behaviour of different types 
of investors, by providing evidence on the relevance of HH direct holdings and showing 
the different patterns that occur in bank stocks and NFC stocks as well as between foreign 
and domestic investors. We argue that our novel findings are also in line with the presence 
of asymmetries of information, and not only liquidity provision, being especially relevant 
for HH trading in bank stocks. 
Evidence in Gibson et al. (2004) and Chemmanur et al (2009) highlights that 
institutional investors trading during an equity issuance is a predictor of future stock 
performance. Such studies conclude that institutional investors, by being more informed 
than other investors, are able to obtain positive returns during equity issuances. We add 
to this previous results by providing relevant information on other important agents in the 
stock market, HH, and showing that increases in domestic HH ownership patters are 
predictors of future negative stock performance for banks but not for NFC following an 
equity issuance.  
The second strand of literature related to our study is the one analyzing the 
important role that banks have in household financial decisions. We complement this 
literature by providing evidence of the aggregate effect of such relations. We show that 
HH show different trading patterns when trading bank stocks than NFC stocks and that 
this is especially true when they share residence with the bank. Hoechle et al. (2018) 
shows evidence consistent with bank financial advisors favoring the interest of the bank 
when advising clients, and these advices resulting in worse results for the client. Golez 
and Marin (2015) find similar incentives problems related to trading decisions of bank 
affiliated-funds. We show evidence consistent with these incentive problems having a 
(negative) impact for domestic HH trading behaviour in bank stocks.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the data 
sources used for our analysis as well as descriptive statistics of our variables of interest. 
Section 3 details our estimation methodology. Section 4 presents the results of our 
estimations related to the evolution of sectorial holdings following a price change and 
Section 5 presents the results regarding the evolution of stock prices after changes in 
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sectorial holdings. Section 6 performs different robustness checks that show how our 
main results are robust to different empirical specifications and sample selections and 
finally section 7 presents our concluding remarks. 
2. Data 
 This section provides in section 2.1 a description of the data sources used in our 
analysis, and in section 2.2 descriptive statistics of the variables used in our study 
differentiating between bank stocks and NFC stocks. 
2.1. Data sources 
 Our dataset is constructed using the SHSS, a large repository of holdings of 
securities collected by the Eurosystem.  The SHSS covers, on a quarterly basis, aggregate 
holdings of securities of institutional (e.g. mutual funds, insurance companies, pension 
funds) and retail sectors (mainly, HH and NFC) based in euro area countries and in the 
rest of the world, albeit with limitations for this latter case. Holdings are directly reported 
to the Eurosystem or collected via custodians, which ensures a comprehensive coverage, 
particularly from Q4 2013 onwards.4 The main advantage of this database is that holdings 
data is available on a security-by-security basis, allowing for a granular view of stocks 
holdings over time. In addition, the SHSS collects some characteristics of securities, such 
as their prices or market capitalization.  
 Our main interest is in holdings of common stocks issued by euro area 
counterparties. To obtain this information, we use the equity module of the SHSS, which 
includes common stocks as well as other equity instruments (e.g. preferred shares). We 
focus on common stocks and match our sample with the Centralised Securities Database 
(CSDB) –also run by the Eurosystem-, which contains a richer set of attributes per 
security. The final sample comprises holdings per institutional sector and country of 
3,889 stocks from Q1 2009 to Q4 2017, of which 3,300 are NFC stocks, 131 are bank 
stocks and 458 are shares issued by non-bank financials.5 Our set of stocks comprise all 
                                                            
4 Before Q4 2013 there are some gaps in holdings data in certain countries. When not reliable, we have 
dropped these holdings from our dataset. Holdings coverage is almost complete after that date. For 
instance, Fache and Rodríguez (2018) show that in Q4 2015 the coverage of SHSS holdings reached nearly 
93% of that recorded in the euro area accounts. It is important to note that such study refers to holdings 
of equity and debt instruments, while we focus on euro area common stocks. 
5 When compared to the Securities issues statistics (SEC) of the European Central Bank, our sample covers 
on average 93% of the total market capitalization of listed shares in the euro area. 
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when new shares are issued. For this subset of periods, we differentiate follow-on 
(seasoned) issuances from other issuances (e.g. scrip dividends) by merging our data with 
that of the Deal Screener of Refinitiv. 
listed shares, including delisted stocks provided that they were active at some point during 
the sample period. Finally, for each common stock the CSDB allows to identify periods 
                                                            
6 In this quarter, we cover 95.1% of the market capitalization of all euro area common stocks, according 
to ECB´s SEC statistics. Holdings coverage, or the ratio of holdings to market capitalization, is 87.8% for 
financials (95.6% in the case of banks stocks), and 90.7% for NFC stocks. 
7 When calculating aggregate holdings of euro area HH, we consider French non-profit institutions serving 
households (NPISH) within the French HH sector as we cannot separate HH holdings from NPISH holdings 
in this country. 
8 Holdings of the RoW are subject to the so-called custodian bias as the client of the non-euro area 
custodian that reports holdings may be another custodian, with clients in the euro area. 
9 Given the incomplete disclosure of RoW our rows in Panel B do not add up to 100%. 
2.2. Holdings data 
2.2.1. Holdings at a glance 
 Table 1 summarizes holdings of euro area common stocks as of the end of 2017, 
which is the last observation in our dataset. Holdings are broken down into issuer sectors 
(rows) and holder sectors (columns). There are two main issuer categories, financials, 
which includes the subsegment of banks, and NFC.6 Holders are euro area institutional 
sectors and are divided into HH (individual investors), NFC, Banks, insurance and 
pension funds (IPF), mutual funds (MF), and “Other”. “Other” comprises all remaining 
categories (e.g. holdings of the public sector or direct investment of financial holdings, 
among others).7 We also show holdings of investors based in the Rest of the World 
(RoW). It is important to highlight that for this sector data is less reliable given the lower 
informational requirements for non-European investors.8 The table is split into three 
panels. Panel A collects the distribution of holdings in EUR bn. Panels B and C describe 
the weight of holdings in total market capitalization as well as the distribution of holdings 
per sector, respectively.9 
 Table 1 shows that HH are major holders of euro area common stocks, especially 
in the case of banks. HH direct holdings accounted for EUR 753 bn in Q4 2017 (Panel 
A), representing 10.0% of the total market capitalization of our set of common stocks 
(Panel B). Interestingly, while HH ownership stands at 9.6% in the NFC segment, it 
reaches 13.8% for banks, being this share much higher than that of NFC and other euro 
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area institutional investors such as Banks and IPF, and comparable to that of MF.10 This 
result barely changes when we consider holdings in previous quarters (see Figures 1.A to 
1.C). Although not shown in the table, we note that HH ownership of banks is very 
different across jurisdictions. For instance, in Spain, where banks predominantly focus 
on retail activities, the share of HH in total banks´ equity more than doubles that of their 
European peers (25.9%). 
The preference of HH for bank stocks is further confirmed when looking at each 
sector’s investment portfolio, i.e. the distribution of holdings per equity segment (Table 
1 Panel C). In Q4 2017, holdings in bank stocks represented 13.4% of the portfolio of 
common stocks of HH. Only the allocation of Banks holders and “Other” holders towards 
these stocks is higher, which could be due to holdings of own stocks in the former case, 
and the role of strategic investors and semi-public entities in the so-called “Other” 
sector.11 In Table A1 in the appendix, we provide further evidence showing that this bias 
towards bank stocks is fundamentally driven by domestic investors, especially HH. 
Interestingly, the allocation towards banks is much higher for domestic HH than for non-
domestic HH. For domestic HH banks represent 14.0% of their direct holdings versus 
7.9% for non-domestic HH (1.8 times more -Table A1 Panel C-), while for domestic HH 
NFC stocks represent 75.9% of their portfolio versus 69.3% for non-domestic HH (1.1 
times, -Table A1 Panel C-) 
A further analysis of HH ownership reveals that HH share is not always higher in 
banks than in NFC stocks. Figure 2 shows the (average) share of HH in the two types of 
common stocks by quintiles of the distribution of the market capitalization of banks (as 
before, data refers to the last data point –Q417-). In the first quintile, which concentrates 
53% of all NFC (NFC are on average smaller than banks), HH ownership is higher in this 
sector than in financial companies. As the market capitalization of companies grows, HH 
ownership diminishes in the case of NFC, while in banks this trend is less clear. It is 
relevant to note how in the second, fourth and fifth quintiles, the share of HH becomes 
                                                            
10 The share of the RoW in the market capitalization of euro area stocks stands at 37%, or 41% of total 
holdings in the SHSS. This is similar to the documented by Fache and Rodríguez (2015) for quoted shares 
(which includes common stocks and other types of shares) using this same database. Holdings data in that 
work refers to Q4 2013. 
11 For illustrative purposes, Table A1 shows holdings information differentiating between domestic and 
non-domestic holders. The main messages of this section hold. In particular, the allocation of domestic 
HH towards bank stocks is higher than that of NFC, IPF and MF holders. 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 16 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 2130
more important in banks than in NFC. For illustrative purposes, a histogram depicting the 
complete distribution of HH ownership in the two stock types is presented in Figure 3.12 
Overall, the aggregate size of HH exposures suggests that the trading behavior of 
this sector might be relevant in driving price developments in stocks. On the other hand, 
the role of HH could be different in banks than in NFC given the concentration of HH 
holdings in the former stocks, and the ties of retail customers with their banks. 
Table 3 focuses on domestic HH (those who invest in securities of their own 
country) and examine changes in ownership and future price performance.  is 
                                                            
our results are not affected by these periods. Finally, we note that we do not know whether the RoW is a 
net buyer of net seller of securities as holdings data is less reliable for this sector. 
                                                            
12 Our main results control for stock fixed effects which ameliorate concerns regarding differences in 
unobservable characteristics among stocks. In order to further analyze possible comparability issues we 
analyze different subsets of stocks in section 6.2. 
13 The institutional sectors in this study (Banks, IPF and MF) are the same as those in Timmer (2018) 
14 We note that netbuy is higher than zero for all holders. This happens for different reasons. First, netbuy 
is positively skewed, and positive changes in holdings are, on average, slightly higher than negative 
changes (which increases the mean of netbuy above zero). Second, netbuy tends to be much higher than 
zero in periods in which the number of shares issued augments (within the same firm). Excluding these 
periods (14% of total observations), the mean of netbuy is closer to zero (and even negative for bank 
holders). In the empirical part, we have performed some exercises (available upon request) to ensure that 
Table 2 and 3 summarize the main variables of interest for the empirical analysis. 
Table 2 describes trading behavior variables and price changes for each holder: 
netbuy and return. Netbuy is the (average) quarterly change in stock holdings, measured 
as the number of shares held (expressed in logs) and calculated at the security level (we 
multiply this variable by 100 for expositional purposes). Return stands for the lagged 
return of the stock (its price change in the previous quarter). We focus on five holder 
types, HH, NFC, Banks, IPF and MF, and two issuer or equity segments, banks and 
NFC.13 Holders are shown in columns, while issuers in rows. Panel A refers to the sample 
of Banks, Panel B to NFC, and Panel C to Banks and NFC. 
The number of observations is larger for HH than for other holders as there are more 
groups of this type of investor (more countries of residence). Except for IPF holders, 
netbuy is higher in banks than in NFC issuers, i.e. holdings increase (on average) more 
when investors trade bank versus NFC securities. Netbuy is also higher in HH than in 
other holders. It is also relevant to note that the standard deviation of netbuy is pronounced 
across firms and holders.14  
2.2.2. Summary statistics 
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the percentage change in the share of domestic HH ownership per security, being the 
share the ratio between the number of shares held by domestic HH to the total number of 
shares. Future price performance is the cumulative change in the log of prices at future 
horizons. For instance, in the second column of this panel,  reflects price 
changes between quarter t+1 and t, while in the third column  takes the 
cumulative price change between quarter t+2 and t. , in the final column, is 
the cumulative price change between quarter t+8 and t, or two years after.  
The mean value of ∆dshare is slightly positive for the full sample (Panel C), being 
somewhat lower for banks (Panel A) than for NFC (Panel B). With regards to future 
returns, future price changes are (on average) positive in NFC but negative for banks 
stocks. The underperformance of banks is expected as our sample period (2009-2017) 
covers the financial and the sovereign crisis, when banks stocks were severely hit.15 
Standard deviations are large, particularly for longer horizons, and similar between the 
two firm types.  
                                                            
15 In table A10 we perform our analysis focusing only in periods in which the aggregate price trends are 
similar both for bank and NFC stocks. See section 6.2 for a description of such analysis  
3. Empirical specification 
 This section presents our empirical framework. We first discuss our strategy to 
analyze the evolution of sectorial stock holdings following a price change, section 3.1. 
We then discuss our strategy related to the implications of sectorial ownership on future 
stock price developments, section 3.2. 
3.1. Sectorial stock holdings and past price evolution 
In order to analyze how different sectors behave following changes in the price of 
a given stock, we follow an identification strategy similar to that of Abassi et al (2016). 
Our objective is to identify which sectors of the economy buy or sell a given stock 
following a price increase and if the pattern is the same for domestic and foreign investors 
in each sector. 
We first run the following set of regressions for each holder-sector:  
 =  
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where x determines the holder-sector under analysis, s identifies the security, t the quarter 
and c the residence of the investor. Netbuy is the change in the holdings of stock s, at 
quarter t, by holders of country c, where holdings are defined as the log of the number of 
shares held by sector x in firm s. Return is the quarterly change of the price of stock s, 
divided by the price of security s in the previous quarter. As Timmer (2018) we lag Return 
by one quarter to prevent that our results are driven by sectorial trading decisions having 
a price impact in such quarter (we also perform a robustness exercise, in the appendix, 
showing that results are unaffected by using current returns). In these sector-by-sector 
specifications we also include security fixed effects, , time fixed effects, , and holder-
country fixed effects, . Our main variable of interest is . For investors that buy (sell) 
after a price increase (decrease)  is positive, while it is negative for those investors that 
buy (sell) after a price decline (increase). 
 We perform two variations of our base specification in order to analyze possible 
heterogeneous behaviours within a given sector. We analyze if domestic and foreign 
investors in a given sector behave in the same way, and also if sectors exhibit the same 
behaviour in bank stocks and in NFC stocks.  
In order to analyze the relevance of the shared residence (domestic holders), we 
extend our main specification and include an interaction term with the variable DOM, 
where DOM identifies those investors in a given sector that have the same residence as 
the firm. We take the firms’ headquarters as the residence of the firm. The coefficient on 
this interaction term allows us to distinguish the behaviour of domestic and foreign 
investors in each given sector.16 This first variation can then be written as follows: 
 =  
We also differentiate between quarters in which there was an increase in the stock 
price and quarters in which there was a decline, in order to analyse if there was a 
symmetric reaction to price increases and declines. We include a dummy variable RISE 
that takes the value 1 if the return was positive and a dummy variable DROP that takes 
the value 1 if the return was negative, and interact them with returns (only positive returns 
are considered with RISE, and negative returns with DROP). The specification follows: 
 =  
                                                            
16 We cover euro area holdings, which implies that foreign investors are those based in the euro area but 
in a different country where the firm is located. 
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We also extend our basic specification in order to differentiate between sectorial 
behaviour in bank stocks and NFC stocks. We do so by first running separate regressions 
of equation (1) for each type of stocks, and then by introducing a dummy variable BANK 
that takes the value one if the stock is a bank stock in our full sample. The interaction 
term Return*BANK highlights the different behaviour of each sector in bank stocks with 
respect to NFC stocks. In this specification we also include the interaction term with the 
dummy variable DOM that takes the value one if the holder-sector is domestic as well as 
security fixed effects, time fixed effects and holder country fixed effects. In our most 
saturated specifications we also include firm-time, firm-holder-country and time-holder-
country fixed effects. The specification for this analysis is: 
 = 
 
3.2. Price implications of stock holdings 
To analyze the evolution of stock prices after a given sector increases (or 
decreases) their holdings in the stock, and similarly to Timmer (2018) among others, we 
run the following specification  
 =   
where , being  the log of the price per 
share of firm s in quarter t+k (t in the case of ), and  
, where  is the ratio between the number of shares of 
firm s held by sector x in quarter t to the total number of shares of firm s in t, i.e. the 
ownership share of sector x. In this specification we also include security and time fixed 
effects. 
 Our coefficient of interest  captures if a change in the overall weight of a given 
sector is related to future price changes in such stock. Following the argument in Keniel 
et al. (2008) we would expect a positive coefficient for those sectors that act as liquidity 
providers in the stock market. However, if some sectors are subject to a lemons problem 
when buying or selling stock we would expect a negative coefficient, as they increase 
(decrease) their holdings when the stock is overvalued (undervalued). 
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As in our previous analysis we perform this analysis both for the subsample of 
bank stocks and NFC stocks to see if sectors perform different roles in each type of stocks.  
In order to better identify the existence of possible asymmetries of information 
we also analyse a subset of periods in which equity issuances occur for a given firm. 
These instances have been argued to be situations in which informational asymmetries 
across market participants heighten. We first identify a quarter in which an equity 
issuance occurs as quarters in which the total number of shares of a given company 
increases, which comprises both scrip issuances and follow-on (seasoned) offerings. Next 
in order to improve identification, we conduct an analysis only for the subset of quarters 
in which the firm undergoes a follow-on offering, which we identify using information 
on seasoned equity offerings provided by the Deal Screener of Refinitiv. The sample 
period of issuances is the same as that of the main sample from 2009:Q1 to 2017:Q4. 
4. Results regarding the evolution of sectorial stock holdings 
We now proceed to report and discuss the results of our study regarding the 
evolution of sectorial stock holdings. In particular, we document the relationship between 
HH (and other sectors’) holdings and past changes in stock prices. We find that HH and 
NFC buy (sell) stocks following a price drop (increase), especially so in bank stocks and 
when they are domestic investors.17 
4. 1 Sectorial investment behaviour 
We now present results on how each sector’s holdings vary following a price 
change in the stocks, as detailed in equation (1). As already explained, in all of our 
estimations, when possible, we saturate the model with time fixed effects, security (firm) 
fixed effects and holder country fixed effects to capture time invariant characteristics of 
stocks or country traits, as well as aggregate market conditions, that could determine 
sectorial investment behaviour. 
Table 4 shows the results for each sector in columns. Both HH (column 1) and 
NFC (column 2) sectors increase their holdings of a given stock after a price decline in 
such stock. Note that both columns 1 and 2 in Table 4 depict a negative and significant 
                                                            
17 To estimate the equations, we winsorize observations at the 2.5th and 97.5th percentile of the 
distribution of netbuy, price returns and ∆dshare to ensure that our results are not driven by outliers.  
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coefficient. On the other hand, Bank (column 3), MF (column 5) and to a lesser extent 
IPF (column 4) sectors decrease their holdings of a given stock after a price decline in 
such stock. Note that for these latter sectors the coefficient is positive and significant for 
Bank and MF, but is not significant for the IPF sector. These results highlight that after a 
price decline the relative relevance of HH and NFC sectors on stock ownership increases, 
being HH the sector that has a higher relative increase in their holdings. 
Table 5 performs the same analysis taking into account if investors of a given 
sector are domestic or foreign, and differentiating between bank stocks in Panel A and 
NFC stocks in Panel B, as depicted in equation (2).18 Table 5 shows how while HH buy 
(sell) following a price decline (increase) both in bank and NFC stocks, this is especially 
true in the case of bank stocks. Note that both coefficients of interest are negative and 
higher for bank stocks than for NFC stocks in column (1) which represents the HH sector 
holdings. 
In order to have a better understanding of the relevance that the links between 
banks and HH might have in the trading decisions of these holders, we differentiate 
between domestic and foreign investors. Our argument is that a domestic HH (or a 
domestic NFC) is more prone to have relations with a given bank than a foreign HH (or 
foreign NFC) and that such relations can shape their investment decisions. Note also that 
less sophisticated investors are more prone to invest in domestic stocks (Karlsson and 
Norden 2007) and hence domestic investors are more prone to be distorted. We also argue 
that consistently with previous literature (e.g. Hoechle et al. 2018) this special 
relationship regarding investment is much more prone to happen in the banking industry 
than in NFCs. 
The differential behavior of domestic HH (and NFC) is captured by the interaction 
Return x DOM, which is negative and significant for bank stocks (Table 5 Panel A), but 
not for NFC stocks (Table 5 Panel B). Thus, for bank stocks domestic HH and domestic 
NFC sectors are more reactive to past price changes than foreign ones, while for NFC 
stocks this is not the case. This result on the relevance of sharing the same residence 
between investors and the banks suggests that the investment behavior of HH and NFC 
is related to the close ties that these two sectors have with their banks.19 
                                                            
18 As already explained an investor is domestic if its residence is the same as that of the firm. 
19 Results hold also when we exclude “hold” decisions, or periods when holders do not change their 
holdings, i.e. netbuy=0. 
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A joint estimation of these effects as expressed in equation (4) is reported in Table 
6, which covers the full sample of bank and NFC stocks, and includes a series of time 
varying fixed effects. The results in Table 6 are in line with those in Table 5 and highlight 
the different behaviour of HH (and NFC) after price declines especially in domestic 
banks. Results remain broadly the same if we consider current returns in stocks (Table 
A2) rather than lagged returns as in our baseline specifications.20 
We end our analysis of how sectorial holdings change after a price change by 
differentiating in Table 7 between price increases and price drops, as explained in 
equation (3), and focusing only on domestic sectors. While we find that the pattern 
depicted in Tables 5 and 6 is maintained, we document that HH and NFC react much 
more after price drops and in bank stocks, as point estimates are nearly four times bigger 
with respect to price increases. Table A3 shows consistent results for a joint estimation 
of these effects. 
 All in all, our results document that the ownership structure of firms changes after 
a decline in their stock price. HH and NFC direct ownership of stocks increases 
(decreases) after a price decline (increase) and this is especially true for domestic holdings 
of bank stocks. Specifically, and regarding the economic effects of these results, a decline 
of one standard deviation in NFC prices leads to an increase of domestic HH holdings of 
0.5%. The change in holdings is five times bigger for the same shock in banks. 
The relevance of these results depends, among other issues, on the existence or 
not of frictions in the stock market. If there would be no frictions in the stock market, like 
those steaming from informational asymmetries, this shift in ownership would be the 
natural consequence of, for example, different liquidity needs of each investor. However, 
if, as argued by Barber and Odean (2000) among others, HH are less informed than other 
investors, this shift in ownership could be the result of informational asymmetries and 
affect the correct pricing of stocks, as they would be held by less informed agents during 
price declines. This would also affect the welfare of those subject to informational 
asymmetries, as they could be overpaying (underselling) for stocks.  
In the next section we proceed to analyze the implications for stock prices of 
changes in sectorial ownership in order to shed some light on the plausibility of the 
existence of informational asymmetries in the stock market. 
                                                            
20 We also note that institutional investors also change their behavior when trading domestic stocks. 
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5 Price implications of sectorial stock ownership 
In this section we document the relationship between changes in sectorial 
ownership and future price developments of a given stock. We first document that an 
increase in (domestic) HH ownership is a predictor of future price increases in NFC 
stocks, in line with the presence of a liquidity channel, but not in bank stocks. We then 
document that in equity issuances, which have been argued to be situations where 
asymmetries of information heighten (Myers and Majluf, 1984 and Miller and Rock, 
1985), increases in domestic HH ownership are predictors of future price declines in bank 
stocks, in line with the presence of an information channel, and not in NFC.  
We argue that the combination of these two sets of findings, as well as those 
presented in section 4, highlight that HH might be having a role of liquidity providers 
and, at the same time, being subject to a lemons problem derived from informational 
asymmetries, being this latter case especially true in domestic bank stocks.   
5. 1 Price implications of sectorial ownership  
 Table 8 reports the results of estimating equation (5) for bank stocks in Panel A 
and for NFC stocks in Panel B. In Panel C, we present a joint estimation for both types 
of stocks. For expositional purposes, we focus on the domestic HH sector in the main text 
and we report results for both foreign HH and other sectors in the Appendix. Each column 
represents the cumulative change in prices up to each quarter. 
 Our results show how an increase in the share of domestic HH holdings in a given 
quarter is a predictor of a permanent future price increases in NFC stocks in the following 
quarters (Panel B). Specifically, an increase in HH holdings of 1 standard deviation 
results in an increase in the price per share of NFC stocks of 0.5% (on average) from t+3 
onwards. This result is in line with the liquidity mechanism present in Kaniel et al (2008). 
However, as Table 8 shows this is not the case for bank stocks (Panel A). In particular, 
for bank stocks, an increase in HH holdings does not predict a future increase in prices 
the quarters following such increase (results are confirmed for the joint sample -Panel C-
).21 These results point out that while overall domestic HH have a behavior consistent 
                                                            
21 Results holds when we consider netbuy rather than ∆dshare (Table A4). However, we use ∆dshare as 
it is indirectly controlling for the behavior of other holders. For instance, if ∆dshare increases it means 
not only that HH holdings augment but also that HH buy more than other sectors. Also to make results 
more comparable with the case of equity issuances (next section) in which the total number of shares 
increase. 
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with them being liquidity providers in NFC stocks and obtaining positive profits when 
the price pressure lifts in the subsequent quarter(s), this is not true for the case of bank 
stocks. 
Table A5 in the appendix reports results for all holder-sectors. Price performance 
is poorer in bank stocks than in NFC stocks when retail holders (HH and NFC) increase 
holdings, although for non-domestic HH there is a positive drift in the price per share of 
banks in the medium term. Focusing on institutional holdings, the positive sign of the 
interaction ∆dshare x Bank for institutional holders (except for domestic IPF) suggest that 
prices go up the quarters after these investors invest in these stocks, although this result 
is in general not statistically significant.22 
5.2 Price implications of sectorial stock ownership in equity issuances 
In order to test if domestic HH could be subject to a lemons problem, especially 
in bank stocks, we turn to analyzing what happens between domestic HH holdings and 
future price developments in the event of equity issuances comparing them with foreign 
HH holdings and with that of other sectors. We focus on these periods as they have been 
argued to be situations in which informational asymmetries between market participants 
heighten.  
In particular, in this subsection we report the results of estimating equation (5) 
only for those quarters in which an equity issuance happens for a given stock. In order to 
do so we characterize all quarters in which a firm undergoes an equity issuance and 
analyze the price behavior in the following quarters. In general, we identify equity 
issuances as periods when the number of issued shares increase, which include scrip 
issuances as well as follow-on offerings. Since during follow-on offerings informational 
asymmetries may be stronger (and thus the “lemons problem” faced by HH), we 
separately run regressions for this subset of issuances. 
 Table 9 shows how changes in domestic HH holdings are related to future price 
developments in stocks differentiating between all equity issuances (Panel A) and follow-
on offerings (Panel B). We find that when domestic HH increase their holdings of banks 
stocks more than other sectors (increase their share or ownership) in the quarter in which 
an equity issuance happens, this predicts a fall in prices in the following quarters (negative 
                                                            
22 When using the joint sample, we incorporate time*issuer sector fixed effects to account for the 
different environment that banks and NFC have faced over the sample period. 
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sign of the interaction ∆dshare x Bank). Interestingly, the effect is not instantaneous, and 
the coefficient grows in absolute terms as the quarters evolve, which is consistent with 
information taking time to be included in prices. The pattern is much clearer in follow-on 
issuances (Panel B), in both statistical and economic terms. In this set of observations, a 
positive shock in HH holdings of 1 standard deviation leads to a decline in the price per 
share of bank stocks of over 15% (on average) from t+3 onwards. Effects are not 
statistically different from zero for NFC stocks. 
Comparing this set of results (Table 9) as well as results reported in Table 8, we 
can conclude that domestic HH are much more prone to be subject to a lemons problem 
when buying bank stocks than when buying NFC stocks.  
As before, Table A6 reports results for all holder-sectors. We focus on the 
subsample of follow-on issuances. One relevant finding is that the price performance of 
bank stocks is not negative when foreign HH increase holdings of these stocks. This in 
line with our argument of domestic HH having closer ties to domestic banks (and being 
subject to a lemons problems). We also document how the negative drift in banks prices 
is also present when domestic NFC increase their ownership but not when non-domestic 
NFC do so. No consistent effects are found for institutional investors, with the exception 
of domestic MF and banks (domestic or not), as prices increase in banks´ stocks when 
these investors gain exposure following an equity issuance.23 
                                                            
23 Table A7 replicates the analyses of section 5 using the future percentage price change in stocks rather 
than changes in the log of future prices, conditional on changes in domestic HH ownership. Price 
performance is still worse for banks than for NFC, particularly after follow-on equity issuances. 
6 Robustness exercises 
In this section we perform a set of robustness exercises regarding our main results. We 
first address possible concerns regarding the interdependence of investment decisions 
section 6.1, and then we address possible concerns regarding comparability of NFC and 
bank stocks in our sample section 6.2.  
6.1 Addressing the interdependence between investment decisions of holders 
When studying the trading behavior of investors, we run our regressions 
individually for each investor category. However, there can be a concern about how 
independent these regressions are, as the trading behavior of one sector may be influenced 
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by the trading behavior of other sectors. In order to ameliorate the potential inference bias 
that could arise when decisions of different types of investors are related, we perform a 
robustness analysis in which we run a common regression for all investors, using the 
seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) procedure. 
For this analysis we first need to restrict the sample to observations for which 
netbuy is defined for all holders (HH, NFC, Banks, etc.) in the same firm and quarter, 
which we call “common exposures”. Given the holdings information, this analysis is only 
feasible for domestic holders, i.e. those that share residence with the issuer of the stock. 
Otherwise, the sample would be restricted to observations in which netbuy is defined for 
all the combinations of holder sectors-countries, and in the same quarter (too few 
observations). In parallel, the number of equations to be estimated by means of the SUR 
would be quite high (one per holder sector-country). 
Table A8 presents the outcome of this robustness exercise. For expositional 
purposes, panel A refers to OLS estimates (our base estimations) and Panel B reports the 
outcome of the SUR estimation. Point estimates are the same in the two exercises as the 
set of predictors is identical under the two methods. However, the SUR provides more 
efficient estimates of standard errors as shown by the p-value of the Breusch-Pagan test 
for independent equations (reported at the bottom of the table). Importantly, the finding 
that HH buy (sell) after a price decrease (increase) with NFC stocks and even more with 
banks stocks also holds for this new specification. In particular, the interaction between 
Return (in t-1) x Bank is negative and significant under the SUR method at the 1% 
confidence level (slightly above this level using OLS). 
6.2 Banks and NFC: comparability issues 
One other possible source of concern is the comparability between banks and 
NFCs in our sample. While both banks and NFCs in our sample are listed companies, the 
size of NFC is on average smaller than that of banks. For instance, as of the end of 2017, 
around 50% of NFCs had a market capitalization below EUR 100 million, while the 
percentage of banks below this level was 20%. On the other hand, the market environment 
of banks and NFC has differed in recent years, with periods in which banks stocks have 
underperformed, and others in which they have outperformed, NFCs stocks. Since in 
general conditions surrounding these two type of issuers have been heterogeneous, one 
could have concerns regarding whether NFCs and banks stocks are actually comparable 
securities for investors during our study and hence our results could be biased. 
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To alleviate comparability issues, we restrict attention to a more homogeneous 
sample of banks and NFCs. In this new sample we focus on common exposures as defined 
in Section 6.1 and further restrict the sample to those stocks (of both banks and NFC) 
with a market capitalization of over EUR 50 million (or over EUR 100 million).24 With 
this approach, we effectively eliminate stocks in which institutional investors hold no 
exposures (less “comparable” securities), and at the same time prevent that our results are 
driven by (very) small firms. 
Table A9 studies the trading behavior of HH with this restricted set of 
observations. Columns 1 to 3 of the table refer to regressions in which there are only 
domestic HH. The other columns also include non-domestic HH. To further improve 
comparability, we have removed very small exposures from the portfolio of non-domestic 
investors.25 In line with previous results, HH increase their holdings after a price decline. 
Besides this effect is prevalent in domestic HH, but not in foreign HH, and especially so 
with banks stocks in comparison to NFC stocks (negative sign of the interaction Return 
(in t-1) x Bank in columns 1-3, and of the interaction Return (in t-1) x Bank x DOM in 
columns 4-12).  
In order to ameliorate the problem of different aggregate trends we restrict in 
Table A10 our attention to time periods in which the stock price evolution in both NFC 
and bank stock prices are similar and find that the pattern also holds.26 
We finally resort to document that the results in section 5 are robust to this 
restricted sample of larger stocks (market capitalization above EUR 50 million). In 
particular, Table A11 shows that banks underperform NFC following an increase in 
domestic HH ownership, and that after a follow-on issuance an increase in domestic HH 
ownership is related to future price declines in bank stocks.27 
                                                            
24 We define companies with a market capitalization of over EUR 50 or 100 million as those that during at 
least 33% of observations present a market capitalization above these levels. 
25 In particular, we calculate the share of each holder in the market capitalization of a stock, and remove 
observations when the share lies below 0.01%. 
26 For each period, we calculate the average lagged return in banks and NFC. We then calculate the 
difference between these two returns, and obtain the distribution of this new variable (comprised 
between -12% and +9%). Periods with similar returns are those in the interquartile range of this 
distribution (-3%, +2%), which we use to run the regressions of table A10. 
27 Panel B considers follow-on offerings and keep all observations for banks as there are not many 
issuances of this type for this sector. 
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7 Conclusions 
 This paper documents the dynamic relationships between aggregate sectorial 
holdings of stocks in the euro area and the price of such stocks. The evidence presented 
in the paper suggests that different sectors in the economy play different roles in the stock 
market, and are subject to different degrees of informational asymmetries. 
We first document that following a price decline HH and NFC sectors are more 
prone to increase their holdings of stocks, while MF, IPF, and Banks are more prone to 
reduce them. We find that this effect is more pronounced for domestic HH (and domestic 
NFC) investing in bank stocks. We then resort to documenting stock price dynamics 
following a change in sectorial holdings and find how in the quarters following an 
increase in domestic HH holdings of a given NFC stock the price of such stock increases. 
However, for bank stocks an increase in domestic HH holdings is not followed by future 
price increases. These findings are consistent with HH providing liquidity to stocks and 
at the same time being subject to (negative) informational  asymmetries, being the latter 
especially important for bank stocks. In order to provide further evidence in line with this 
argument, we document that during follow-on offerings an increase in domestic HH 
holdings is followed by a decline in future prices of bank stocks and not in NFC stocks. 
Our results highlight the relevance of understanding the different behavior of 
sectors present in the stock market as we document that when stock prices decline the 
weight of less sophisticated (and domestic) participants increase, being this especially 
important in bank stocks. This situation can affect both price formation and regulatory 
responses that are based on stock prices, like for example the introduction of bank 
bailouts. National regulators can be more prone to introduce favorable bail-out regimes 
for stock holders if by doing so they favor their own nationals. As already discussed, our 
study also provides evidence in line with domestic HH being subject to informational 
asymmetries when buying bank stocks, especially during equity issuances. This latter 
evidence should be taken into account by both stock market and bank regulators in order 
to enhance the price informativeness of bank stocks. We argue that, given the close HH-
bank relationships, banks can have an important role in ameliorating the informational 
asymmetries faced by HH, and at the same time improve price informativeness, by 
providing good financial advice to their clients.   
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Tables 
 
Table 1. Holdings in 2017 Q4 at a glance  
 
This table summarizes holdings of euro area common stocks as of the end of 2017 (last observation), according to 
SHSS data. Holdings data is split into two issuer categories, financials, which includes the subsegment of banks, and 
NFC. Holders are euro area institutional sectors and comprise either HH (individual investors), NFC, Banks, insurance 
and pension funds (IPF), and mutual funds (MF), while Other comprises all remaining categories (e.g. holdings of the 
public sector or holdings of financial holdings, among others). Total EA is the sum of holdings of the previous holders. 
In addition, we show holdings of investors based in the Rest of the World (RoW), although holdings data is less reliable 
in this segment. Panel A collects the distribution of holdings in EUR bn. Panels B and C are simple derivations of Panel 
A and describe the weight of holdings of each holder sector in total market capitalization as well as the distribution of 
holdings per holder, respectively. In Panel B holdings do not sum up 100% (see last column, in which we report 
holdings coverage for each sector). This happens because holdings information is incomplete for the Rest of the World 
(RoW) sector, and because holdings coverage is somewhat below 100% for the other sectors. 
Panel A. Holdings (EUR bn) HH NFC Banks IPF MF Other Total EA RoW
Total 753 1,046 202 215 1,148 625 3,989 2,777
Financials 187 49 74 53 244 189 796 630
   of which: Banks 101 19 38 17 119 98 392 308
NFC 566 997 128 162 904 436 3,193 2,147
Panel B. Weight in market 
cap. (%)
HH NFC Banks IPF MF Other Total EA RoW
holdings 
coverage (%)
Total 10.0 13.9 2.7 2.9 15.3 8.3 53.1 37.0 90.1
Financials 11.5 3.0 4.6 3.3 15.0 11.6 49.0 38.8 87.8
   of which: Banks 13.8 2.6 5.2 2.4 16.2 13.4 53.5 42.1 95.6
NFC 9.6 16.9 2.2 2.8 15.4 7.4 54.3 36.5 90.7
Panel C. Distribution of 
holdings (%)
HH NFC Banks IPF MF Other Total EA RoW
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Financials 24.8 4.7 36.8 24.7 21.3 30.2 20.0 22.7
   of which: Banks 13.4 1.8 18.7 8.0 10.3 15.7 9.8 11.1
NFC 75.2 95.3 63.2 75.3 78.7 69.8 80.0 77.3
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Table 2. Summary Statistics. Trading behavior 
 
This table studies the trading behavior of each holder sector. Panel A refers to the sample of Banks, Panel B to NFC, 
and Panel C to Banks and NFC. Netbuy is the (average) quarterly change in stock holdings, measured as the number 
of shares held (expressed in logs) and calculated at the security level. We multiply this variable by 100 to read it 
similarly to a percentage change. Return stands for the lagged return of the stock, or its price change in the previous 
quarter. 
 
Panel A. Banks HH NFC Banks IPF MF
Netbuy (mean) 2.71 1.29 1.02 0.93 1.43
Netbuy (sd) 33.34 36.02 51.07 34.97 36.32
Return (mean) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Return (sd) 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17
Observations 18,202 8,819 6,018 9,298 14,468
Panel B. NFC HH NFC Banks IPF MF
Netbuy (mean) 1.49 1.02 0.01 1.25 1.23
Netbuy (sd) 31.09 32.45 54.69 36.00 34.34
Return (mean) 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03
Return (sd) 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15
Observations 340,666 139,909 80,809 122,258 206,401
Panel C. Banks and NFC HH NFC Banks IPF MF
Netbuy (mean) 1.55 1.03 0.08 1.22 1.24
Netbuy (sd) 31.21 32.67 54.45 35.93 34.47
Return (mean) 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03
Return (sd) 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.15
Observations 358,868 148,728 86,827 131,556 220,869
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Table 3. Summary Statistics. Domestic HH ownership and future price performance 
 
The table focuses on domestic HH (those who invest in securities of their own country) and examines changes in 
ownership and future price performance in banks stocks (Panel A), NFC stocks (Panel B) and in both stocks (Panel C). 
∆dshare is defined as share(t)/share(t-1)-1, where share is the ratio between the number of shares held by HH to the 
total number of shares of the firm, expressed in percentage points. Future price performance consists of changes in the 
log of prices at future horizons. We multiply this variable by 100 to read it similarly to a percentage change. For 
instance, in the second column of the table, ∆Price(t+1) summarizes price changes between quarter t+1 and t, while in 
the third column ∆Price(t+2) takes the cumulative change in the log of prices between quarter t+2 and t. ∆Price(t+8), 
in the final column, is the cumulative change in the log of prices between quarter t+8 (two years after the trade) and t. 
















Mean 0.28 -0.92 -0.94 -1.75 -2.56 -2.91 -3.13 -3.73 -4.44
sd 10.20 17.96 22.86 29.89 35.15 39.57 44.35 49.20 53.11
Observations 2784 2784 2638 2529 2413 2301 2201 2103 2003
















Mean 0.53 0.35 0.61 0.64 0.58 0.47 0.32 -0.14 -0.51
sd 11.11 19.74 24.97 31.32 37.22 42.55 47.36 51.93 55.85
Observations 66357 66357 63676 60945 58294 55605 53044 50536 47978
















Mean 0.52 0.30 0.55 0.54 0.45 0.33 0.19 -0.28 -0.67
sd 11.08 19.67 24.89 31.27 37.14 42.44 47.25 51.83 55.75
Observations 69141 69141 66314 63474 60707 57906 55245 52639 49981
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Table 4. Sectorial response to a stock price change 
 
The table studies how the holdings of each sector varies following a price change in the stocks. The sample period runs 
from Q1 2009 to Q4 2017. The dependent variable is netbuy or the (average) quarterly change in stock holdings, 
measured as the number of shares held (expressed in logs) and calculated at the security level. We multiply this variable 
by 100 to read it similarly to a percentage change. Return stands for the lagged return of the stock, or its price change 
in the previous quarter. We run five regressions in total, each per holder sector (HH=households or individual investors; 
NFC=non-financial corporations; Banks are banks; IPF=Insurance and Pension Funds; MF=Mutual Funds). The 
sample of firms is made up of bank and NFC stocks. All specifications include firm fixed effects, time fixed effects 
and holder country fixed effects. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses and are clustered at the security level: 
 p < 0.1,  p < 0.05,  p < 0.01. 
Dependent variable: change in the log of the number of shares held
HH NFC Banks IPF MF
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Return (in t-1) -5.414*** -1.907*** 9.507*** 0.988 7.415***
(0.535) (0.709) (1.385) (0.927) (0.741)
R-squared 0.023 0.020 0.036 0.025 0.019
Observations 358836 148669 86721 131445 220814
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y
Time FE Y Y Y Y Y
Holder country FE Y Y Y Y Y
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Table 5. Sectorial response to a stock price change. Domestic vs foreign holders 
 
The table studies how the holdings of each sector varies following a price change in the stocks. The sample period runs 
from Q1 2009 to Q4 2017. The dependent variable is netbuy or the (average) quarterly change in stock holdings, 
measured as the number of shares held (expressed in logs) and calculated at the security level. We multiply this variable 
by 100 to read it similarly to a percentage change. Return stands for the lagged return of the stock, or its price change 
in the previous quarter. DOM is a dummy equal to one if the residence of the holder sector is the same as that of the 
firm/stock traded, and zero otherwise. In the two panels, we run five regressions in total, each per holder sector, 
differentiating between holdings of bank stocks (Panel A) and NFC stocks (Panel B). All specifications include firm 
fixed effects, time fixed effects, holder country fixed effects and domestic holder fixed effects. Robust standard errors 
are shown in parentheses and are clustered at the security level:  p < 0.1,  p < 0.05,  p < 0.01. 
Dependent variable: change in the log of the number of shares held
Panel A. Banks HH NFC Banks IPF MF
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Return (in t-1) -10.73*** -4.349 2.497 4.981 3.051
(3.557) (4.192) (6.095) (3.378) (3.546)
Return (in t-1) x DOM -6.931** -10.27** 3.294 -16.23*** -0.206
(2.947) (4.005) (9.522) (4.021) (4.638)
R-squared 0.041 0.022 0.033 0.031 0.029
Observations 18200 8815 6017 9296 14468
Panel B. NFC HH NFC Banks IPF MF
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Return (in t-1) -4.977*** -2.617*** 5.963*** 3.161*** 7.953***
(0.601) (0.999) (1.847) (1.137) (0.862)
Return (in t-1) x DOM -1.028 1.619 9.051*** -7.337*** -1.678
(0.702) (1.179) (2.500) (1.570) (1.211)
R-squared 0.022 0.020 0.038 0.026 0.019
Observations 340636 139854 80704 122149 206346
Controls
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y
Time FE Y Y Y Y Y
Holder country FE Y Y Y Y Y
Domestic holder FE Y Y Y Y Y
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Dependent variable: change in the log of the number of shares held
Banks and NFC
(1) (2) ´(3) ´(4) ´(5) ´(6) ´(7) ´(8) ´(9) ´(10)
Return (in t-1) -5.039*** . -2.629*** . 6.194*** . 3.093*** . 7.778*** .
(0.599) . (0.996) . (1.839) . (1.125) . (0.856) .
Return (in t-1) x DOM -1.032 -4.777*** 1.591 -0.659 8.960*** 9.799*** -7.317*** -10.89*** -1.608 -6.105***
(0.702) (0.699) (1.179) (1.521) (2.501) (3.747) (1.570) (2.234) (1.210) (1.420)
Return (in t-1) x Bank -2.744 . 3.368 . -7.516 . 1.602 . -0.282 .
(3.126) . (3.239) . (5.339) . (2.652) . (2.864) .
Bank x DOM 0.249 . -0.611 . -2.291* . -0.434 . 0.175 .
(0.406) . (0.828) . (1.220) . (0.744) . (0.583) .
Return (in t-1) x Bank x DOM -5.177* -6.898** -11.69*** -15.59*** -3.202 -21.43* -8.469* -7.075 0.570 0.00143
(3.108) (2.770) (4.171) (4.326) (9.832) (12.88) (4.348) (6.351) (4.827) (4.732)
R-squared 0.023 0.287 0.020 0.351 0.037 0.427 0.026 0.345 0.019 0.274
Observations 358836 346949 148669 115230 86721 59098 131445 113970 220814 203899
Controls
Firm FE Y . Y . Y . Y . Y .
Time FE Y . Y . Y . Y . Y .
Holder country FE Y . Y . Y . Y . Y .
Domestic holder FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm x Time FE N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y
Firm x Holder country FE N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y
Time x Holder country FE N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y
HH NFC Banks IPF MF

















The table studies how the holdings of each sector varies following a price change in the stocks. The sample period runs from Q1 2009 to Q4 2017. The dependent variable is netbuy or the 
(average) quarterly change in stock holdings, measured as the number of shares held (expressed in logs) and calculated at the security level. We multiply this variable by 100 to read it similarly 
to a percentage change. Return stands for the lagged return of the stock, or its price change in the previous quarter. DOM is a dummy equal to one if the residence of the holder sector is the 
same as that of the firm/stock traded, and zero otherwise. Bank is a dummy equal to one if the issuer is a bank, and zero if the issuer is a NFC. We run ten regressions in total, two per holder 
sector (HH=households or individual investors; NFC=non-financial corporations; Banks are banks; IPF=Insurance and Pension Funds; MF=Mutual Funds). Specifications in columns 1, 3, 5, 7 
and 9 include firm fixed effects, time fixed effects, holder country fixed effects and domestic holder fixed effects. Specifications in other columns include other time varying fixed effects as 
well as domestic holder fixed effects (which is not redundant as a very limited number of firms change their domicile over time). Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses and are 
clustered at the security level:  p < 0.1,  p < 0.05,  p < 0.01.  
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Table 7. Positive and negative returns. Only domestic holders 
 
The table studies how the holdings of domestic holders varies following a positive or negative price change in the 
stocks. The sample period runs from Q1 2009 to Q4 2017. The dependent variable is netbuy or the (average) quarterly 
change in stock holdings, measured as the number of shares held (expressed in logs) and calculated at the security level. 
We multiply this variable by 100 to read it similarly to a percentage change. Return stands for the lagged return of the 
stock, or its price change in the previous quarter. RISE is a dummy equal to one for positive price changes (in t-1), and 
zero otherwise. DROP is a dummy equal to one for negative price changes (in t-1), and zero otherwise. In the two 
panels, we  run five regressions in total, each per holder sector (HH=households or individual investors; NFC=non-
financial corporations; Banks are banks; IPF=Insurance and Pension Funds; MF=Mutual Funds), differentiating 
between holdings of bank stocks (Panel A) and NFC stocks (Panel B). All specifications include firm fixed effects, 
time fixed effects and holder country fixed effects. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses and are clustered 
at the security level:  p < 0.1,  p < 0.05,  p < 0.01. 
Panel A. Banks HH NFC Banks IPF MF
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Return (in t-1) x RISE -5.477 -5.583 4.244 -10.26 -1.468
(3.881) (5.291) (15.06) (8.854) (8.543)
Return (in t-1) x DROP -23.93*** -21.93*** 5.425 -10.01 9.915
(7.554) (7.910) (17.91) (7.719) (9.658)
R-squared 0.091 0.058 0.065 0.073 0.066
Observations 2648 2482 2151 2180 2354
Panel B. NFC HH NFC Banks IPF MF
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Return (in t-1) x RISE -2.042** -0.157 8.738*** -4.318* 3.622**
(0.964) (1.293) (3.316) (2.221) (1.632)
Return (in t-1) x DROP -3.890*** 2.204 23.61*** -2.862 10.78***
(1.352) (1.731) (4.400) (3.085) (2.437)
R-squared 0.074 0.055 0.084 0.066 0.077
Observations 63067 57258 35662 32283 41840
Controls
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y
Time FE Y Y Y Y Y
Holder country FE Y Y Y Y Y
Dependent variable: change in the log of the number of shares held
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Table 8. Future price performance and domestic HH share 
 
 
The table shows how price changes at future horizons conditional on an increase or a decrease in domestic HH 
ownership. The sample period runs from Q1 2009 to Q4 2017. The dependent variable is ∆Price(t+k), where k=1,2,…8, 
and represents the cumulative change in the log of prices since quarter t to quarter t+k. We multiply this variable by 
100 to read it similarly to a percentage change. ∆dshare is defined as share(t)/share(t-1)-1, where share is the ratio 
between the number of shares held by HH to the total number of shares of the firm, expressed in percentage points . 
Bank is a dummy equal to one if the issuer is a bank, and zero if the issuer is a NFC. Panel A shows results for bank 
stocks, Panel B for NFC stocks and Panel C for both. All specifications include firm fixed effects and time*issuer 
sector fixed effects, which is not redundant in panel C. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses and are 
clustered at the security level:  p < 0.1,  p < 0.05,  p < 0.01. 
Dependent variable: change in the log of prices between t and t+k (k=1,2,…,8)
Panel A. Bank t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6 t+7 t+8
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆dshare 0.0209 0.000 -0.0136 0.0246 0.0110 -0.00351 0.0773 0.0713
(0.0145) (0.0199) (0.0223) (0.0185) (0.0282) (0.0332) (0.0471) (0.0572)
R-squared 0.374 0.433 0.445 0.478 0.513 0.521 0.522 0.532
Observations 2784 2638 2529 2413 2301 2201 2103 2003
Panel B. NFC t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6 t+7 t+8
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆dshare 0.0258*** 0.0369*** 0.0448*** 0.0535*** 0.0501*** 0.0604*** 0.0658*** 0.0808***
(0.00423) (0.00664) (0.00834) (0.0100) (0.0102) (0.0122) (0.0139) (0.0148)
R-squared 0.172 0.210 0.251 0.285 0.318 0.352 0.384 0.419
Observations 66357 63676 60945 58294 55605 53044 50536 47978
Panel C. Banks and NFC t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6 t+7 t+8
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆dshare 0.0268*** 0.0394*** 0.0471*** 0.0545*** 0.0516*** 0.0630*** 0.0667*** 0.0803***
(0.00415) (0.00656) (0.00812) (0.00968) (0.00986) (0.0117) (0.0134) (0.0141)
∆dshare x Bank 0.0000206 -0.0394* -0.0610*** -0.0320* -0.0450* -0.0876** -0.00500 -0.00489
(0.0152) (0.0208) (0.0213) (0.0187) (0.0265) (0.0348) (0.0463) (0.0531)
R-squared 0.179 0.218 0.258 0.292 0.325 0.358 0.389 0.423
Observations 69141 66314 63474 60707 57906 55245 52639 49981
Controls
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Time x issuer sector FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
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Table 9. Future price performance after equity issuances and domestic HH share 
The table shows how price changes in stocks at future horizons following an equity issuance and conditional on an 
increase or a decrease in domestic HH ownership. The sample period runs from Q1 2009 to Q4 2017. The dependent 
variable is ∆Price(t+k), where k=1,2,…8, and represents the cumulative change in the log of prices since quarter t to 
quarter t+k. We multiply this variable by 100 to read it similarly to a percentage change. ∆dshare is defined as 
share(t)/share(t-1)-1, where share is the ratio between the number of shares held by HH to the total number of shares 
of the firm, expressed in percentage points. Panel A refers to all equity issuances, while Panel B restricts the sample to 
follow-on issuances. Bank is a dummy equal to one if the issuer is a bank, and zero if the issuer is a NFC. All 
specifications include firm fixed effects and time*issuer sector fixed effects. Robust standard errors are shown in 
parentheses and are clustered at the security level:  p < 0.1,  p < 0.05,  p < 0.01. 
Dependent variable: change in the log of prices between t and t+k (k=1,2,…,8)
Panel A. All issuances t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6 t+7 t+8
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆dshare 0.0111 0.0189 0.0165 0.00412 -0.00914 0.0130 0.0310 0.0325
(0.00871) (0.0137) (0.0190) (0.0204) (0.0238) (0.0263) (0.0302) (0.0313)
∆dshare x Bank -0.0201 -0.0196 -0.127* -0.0457 -0.0451 -0.0835 -0.0450 -0.0836
(0.0302) (0.0359) (0.0653) (0.0535) (0.0838) (0.0705) (0.111) (0.107)
R-squared 0.376 0.393 0.415 0.457 0.482 0.502 0.522 0.534
Observations 6478 6198 5889 5623 5365 5133 4842 4590
Panel B. Follow-on t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6 t+7 t+8
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆dshare 0.0169 -0.00315 -0.0570 -0.0402 -0.177* -0.0736 0.0278 0.0110
(0.0430) (0.0685) (0.0823) (0.0956) (0.102) (0.131) (0.142) (0.137)
∆dshare x Bank 0.108 -0.244** -0.625*** -0.740*** -0.560*** -0.910** -1.818*** -1.841***
(0.180) (0.115) (0.139) (0.178) (0.199) (0.404) (0.266) (0.255)
R-squared 0.205 0.191 0.184 0.170 0.192 0.154 0.182 0.168
Observations 1637 1585 1512 1464 1383 1325 1263 1219
Controls
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Time x issuer sector FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
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Figures 
Figure 1.A. Share of each holder sector in the market capitalization of euro area 
stocks, in % (Q413-Q417) 
  
Holders sectors are the same as in Table 1. We do not show holdings data before Q413 as the coverage 
of holdings is incomplete for some countries before that date, which makes time series on holdings less 
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Figure 1.B. Share of each holder sector in the market capitalization of banks based 
in the euro area, in % (Q413-Q417) 
  
Holders sectors are the same as in Table 1. We do not show holdings data before Q413 as the coverage 
of holdings is incomplete for some countries before that date, which makes time series on holdings less 
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Figure 1.C. Share of each holder sector in the market capitalization of NFC based 
in the euro area, in % (Q413-Q417) 
  
Holders sectors are the same as in Table 1. We do not show holdings data before Q413 as the coverage 
of holdings is incomplete for some countries before that date, which makes time series on holdings less 
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Figure 2. HH ownership in banks versus NFC. Q4 2017. 
 
The figure shows the average share of HH in banks and NFC (x axis) by quintiles of the distribution of the 
market capitalization of banks (y axis). “Q1” stands for the first quintile (banks with market capitalization 
below 100 million euros), “Q2” is the second quintile (market capitalization between 100-400 million 
euros), “Q3” for the third one (400-1,600 million euros), “Q4” for the fourth one (1,600-6,700 million 
euros), and “Q5” for the fifth one (more than 6,700 million euros). Data refers to Q4 2017 and is in %. 
 
Figure 3. HH ownership in banks and NFC. Histograms. Q4 2017 
 
The figure depicts the distribution of the share of HH in bank and NFC stocks (x axis). Data on HH 
ownership refers to Q4 2017 and is in %. 




Table A1. Holdings data. Breakdown between domestic and non-domestic holders 
 
 
This table summarizes holdings of euro area common stocks as of the end of 2017 (last data point), according to SHSS data. Holdings data is split in the same way as Table 1, but in this table we 
differentiate between domestic holders and non-domestic holders, and omit holdings of non-euro area investors (RoW). Domestic holders share residence with the issuer of the stock. Non-domestic 
holders are investors from other euro area countries (“other EMU”). In Panel B holdings do not sum up 100% as we exclude holdings of the RoW sector and holdings coverage is somewhat below 
100% for euro area sectors. 
  
Panel A. Holdings (EUR bn)
domestic other EMU domestic other EMU domestic other EMU domestic other EMU domestic other EMU domestic other EMU
Total 678 75 983 62 163 39 126 89 358 790 468 158
Financials 164 23 45 4 63 12 36 17 65 179 151 38
   of which: Banks 95 6 18 1 30 7 10 8 32 87 78 20
NFC 514 52 939 58 100 27 90 72 294 611 316 120
Panel B. Weight of holdings in market cap. (%)
domestic other EMU domestic other EMU domestic other EMU domestic other EMU domestic other EMU domestic other EMU
Total 9.0 1.0 13.1 0.8 2.2 0.5 1.7 1.2 4.8 10.5 6.2 2.1
Financials 10.1 1.4 2.7 0.3 3.9 0.7 2.2 1.1 4.0 11.0 9.3 2.3
   of which: Banks 13.0 0.8 2.4 0.2 4.2 1.0 1.3 1.0 4.3 11.9 10.6 2.8
NFC 8.7 0.9 16.0 1.0 1.7 0.5 1.5 1.2 5.0 10.4 5.4 2.0
Panel C. Distribution of holdings (%)
domestic other EMU domestic other EMU domestic other EMU domestic other EMU domestic other EMU domestic other EMU
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Financials 24.1 30.7 4.5 7.2 38.4 30.0 28.6 19.2 18.1 22.7 32.3 23.8
   of which: Banks 14.0 7.9 1.8 2.2 18.7 18.9 7.7 8.5 8.9 11.0 16.6 12.8
NFC 75.9 69.3 95.5 92.8 61.6 70.0 71.4 80.8 81.9 77.3 67.7 76.2
HH NFC Banks IPF MF Other
Other
HH NFC Banks IPF MF Other
HH NFC Banks IPF MF
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Table A2. Sectorial responses to price changes. Full sample of bank and NFC stocks. Current returns 
 
The table studies how the holdings of each sector varies following a price change in the stocks. The sample period runs from Q1 2009 to Q4 2017. The dependent variable is netbuy or the (average) 
quarterly change in stock holdings, measured as the number of shares held (expressed in logs) and calculated at the security level. We multiply this variable by 100 to read it similarly to a percentage 
change. Return stands for the return of the stock, or its price change in the current quarter. DOM is a dummy equal to one if the residence of the holder sector is the same as that of the firm/stock 
traded, and zero otherwise. Bank is a dummy equal to one if the issuer is a bank, and zero if the issuer is a NFC. We run ten regressions in total, two per holder sector (HH=households or individual 
investors; NFC=non-financial corporations; Banks are banks; IPF=Insurance and Pension Funds; MF=Mutual Funds). Specifications in columns 1, 3, 5, 7 and 9 include firm fixed effects, time fixed 
effects, holder country fixed effects and domestic holder fixed effects. Specifications in other columns include other time varying fixed effects as well as domestic holder fixed effects (not redundant 
as a very limited number of firms change their domicile over time). Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses and are clustered at the security level:  p < 0.1,  p < 0.05,  p < 0.01. 
Dependent variable: change in the log of the number of shares held
Banks and NFC
(1) (2) ´(3) ´(4) ´(5) ´(6) ´(7) ´(8) ´(9) ´(10)
Return (in t) -13.27*** . -16.01*** . -15.27*** . -9.551*** . 10.19*** .
(0.674) . (1.108) . (1.957) . (1.072) . (0.871) .
Return (in t) x DOM -1.315* -3.732*** 6.118*** -0.763 -16.23*** -16.21*** 2.397 -7.402*** -20.82*** -12.01***
(0.765) (0.726) (1.258) (1.523) (2.540) (3.818) (1.568) (2.108) (1.355) (1.474)
Return (in t) x Bank -5.679* . -5.923 . 2.176 . 5.592** . 6.691** .
(3.002) . (3.831) . (5.819) . (2.370) . (2.889) .
Bank x DOM 0.0519 . -0.873 . -1.953* . -0.494 . -0.450 .
(0.366) . (0.735) . (1.113) . (0.708) . (0.603) .
Return (in t) x Bank x DOM -7.528** -12.31*** -4.525 -12.10** -7.890 -10.29 -8.342* -6.056 13.74*** 3.568
(3.796) (3.714) (5.021) (5.922) (8.877) (11.53) (4.929) (6.156) (4.749) (4.857)
R-squared 0.026 0.271 0.022 0.336 0.039 0.422 0.026 0.333 0.020 0.262
Observations 382136 368783 159006 122256 93262 63026 140083 120764 233973 215213
Controls
Firm FE Y . Y . Y . Y . Y .
Time FE Y . Y . Y . Y . Y .
Holder country FE Y . Y . Y . Y . Y .
Domestic holder FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm x Time FE N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y
Firm x Holder country FE N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y
Time x Holder country FE N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y
HH NFC Banks IPF MF
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Table A3. Positive and negative returns. Only Domestic holders 
  
The table studies how the holdings of domestic holders varies following a positive or negative price change in the 
stocks. The sample period runs from Q1 2009 to Q4 2017. The dependent variable is netbuy or the (average) quarterly 
change in stock holdings, measured as the number of shares held (expressed in logs) and calculated at the security level. 
We multiply this variable by 100 to read it similarly to a percentage change. Return stands for the lagged return of the 
stock, or its price change in the previous quarter. RISE is a dummy equal to one for positive price changes (in t-1), and 
zero otherwise, whereas DROP is a dummy equal to one for negative price changes (in t-1), and zero otherwise. Bank 
is equal to one for bank stocks and is zero for NFC stocks. We run five regressions in total, each per holder sector 
(HH=households or individual investors; NFC=non-financial corporations; Banks are banks; IPF=Insurance and 
Pension Funds; MF=Mutual Funds). All specifications include firm fixed effects, time*issuer sector fixed effects, and 
holder country fixed effects. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses and are clustered at the security level:  
p < 0.1,  p < 0.05,  p < 0.01. 
Banks and NFC HH NFC Banks IPF MF
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Return (in t-1) x RISE -2.043** -0.157 8.738*** -4.318* 3.615**
(0.964) (1.293) (3.317) (2.222) (1.633)
Return (in t-1) x RISE x bank -3.425 -5.422 -4.495 -5.933 -5.043
(3.953) (5.380) (15.21) (9.005) (8.602)
Return (in t-1) x DROP -3.878*** 2.205 23.61*** -2.860 10.84***
(1.352) (1.731) (4.402) (3.085) (2.436)
Return (in t-1) x DROP x bank -20.44*** -24.25*** -18.19 -7.342 -1.535
(7.619) (8.035) (18.19) (8.255) (10.01)
R-squared 0.074 0.055 0.084 0.066 0.076
Observations 65715 59740 37813 34463 44194
Controls
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y
Time x issuer sector FE Y Y Y Y Y
Holder country FE Y Y Y Y Y
Holders: only domestic
Dependent variable: change in the log of the number of shares held
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Table A4. Future price performance with netbuy 
 
 
The table shows how price changes at future horizons conditional on an increase or a decrease in domestic HH 
ownership. The sample period runs from Q1 2009 to Q4 2017. The dependent variable is the future change in the price 
of the stock, calculated as the difference in the log of the price per share between quarter t and quarter t+k (where 
k=1,2,…8). Netbuy is the (average) quarterly change in stock holdings, measured as the number of shares held 
(expressed in logs) and calculated at the security level. We multiply both variables by 100 to read them similarly to a 
percentage change. Panel A shows results for bank stocks, Panel B for NFC stocks, and panel C for both. All 
specifications include firm fixed effects and time*issuer sector fixed effects, which is not redundant in panel C. Robust 
standard errors are shown in parentheses and are clustered at the security level:  p < 0.1,  p < 0.05,  p < 0.01. 
  
Dependent variable: change in the log of prices between t and t+k (k=1,2,…,8)
Panel A. Bank t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6 t+7 t+8
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
netbuy -0.00312 -0.0167 -0.0345 -0.00526 0.0431 0.0661 0.111** 0.00968
(0.0182) (0.0257) (0.0227) (0.0316) (0.0392) (0.0481) (0.0445) (0.0446)
R-squared 0.380 0.430 0.440 0.473 0.504 0.519 0.535 0.544
Observations 2737 2602 2496 2389 2280 2178 2076 1978
Panel B. NFC t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6 t+7 t+8
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
netbuy 0.0211*** 0.0351*** 0.0420*** 0.0496*** 0.0487*** 0.0641*** 0.0717*** 0.0904***
(0.00395) (0.00591) (0.00724) (0.00822) (0.00952) (0.0110) (0.0120) (0.0132)
R-squared 0.167 0.204 0.246 0.280 0.313 0.346 0.377 0.412
Observations 68067 65363 62558 59863 57134 54510 51909 49312
Panel C. Banks and NFC t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6 t+7 t+8
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
netbuy 0.0211*** 0.0351*** 0.0420*** 0.0496*** 0.0487*** 0.0641*** 0.0717*** 0.0904***
(0.00395) (0.00591) (0.00724) (0.00822) (0.00952) (0.0110) (0.0120) (0.0132)
netbuy x Bank -0.0242 -0.0519** -0.0765*** -0.0548* -0.00563 0.00203 0.0394 -0.0807*
(0.0184) (0.0261) (0.0236) (0.0323) (0.0400) (0.0488) (0.0456) (0.0460)
R-squared 0.174 0.211 0.252 0.286 0.319 0.352 0.383 0.416
Observations 70804 67965 65054 62252 59414 56688 53985 51290
Controls
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Time x issuer sector FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 48 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 2130
Table A5. Future price performance and changes in sectorial ownership 
 
Dependent variable: change in the log of prices between t and t+k (k=1,2,…,8)
Panel A. Domestic HH t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6 t+7 t+8
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆dshare 0.0268*** 0.0394*** 0.0471*** 0.0545*** 0.0516*** 0.0630*** 0.0667*** 0.0803***
(0.00415) (0.00656) (0.00812) (0.00968) (0.00986) (0.0117) (0.0134) (0.0141)
∆dshare x Bank 0.0000206 -0.0394* -0.0610*** -0.0320* -0.0450* -0.0876** -0.00500 -0.00489
(0.0152) (0.0208) (0.0213) (0.0187) (0.0265) (0.0348) (0.0463) (0.0531)
R-squared 0.179 0.218 0.258 0.292 0.325 0.358 0.389 0.423
Observations 69141 66314 63474 60707 57906 55245 52639 49981
Panel B. Non-domestic HH t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6 t+7 t+8
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆dshare -0.00110 0.000961 0.0000783 -0.000466 0.00130 0.00191 0.00504 0.0103*
(0.00183) (0.00280) (0.00360) (0.00417) (0.00454) (0.00519) (0.00577) (0.00620)
∆dshare x Bank 0.0134* 0.0130 0.0256* 0.0282* 0.0552*** 0.0551*** 0.0489** 0.0118
(0.00708) (0.0103) (0.0142) (0.0168) (0.0181) (0.0208) (0.0241) (0.0249)
R-squared 0.203 0.236 0.273 0.303 0.330 0.360 0.390 0.421
Observations 65682 63109 60493 57922 55343 52876 50409 47991
Panel C. Domestic NFC t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6 t+7 t+8
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆dshare 0.136*** 0.116*** 0.0447 0.145** 0.165** 0.165** 0.136 0.214**
(0.0313) (0.0423) (0.0514) (0.0626) (0.0707) (0.0800) (0.0899) (0.101)
∆dshare x Bank -0.0429 -0.378** -0.0187 -0.630* -0.0456 -0.672 -0.0179 0.310
(0.140) (0.147) (0.248) (0.357) (0.359) (0.544) (0.391) (0.479)
R-squared 0.183 0.221 0.262 0.296 0.328 0.361 0.391 0.425
Observations 62938 60454 57888 55350 52814 50368 47986 45607
Panel D. Non-domestic NFC t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6 t+7 t+8
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆dshare 0.137 0.437** -0.0311 0.108 0.515 0.343 0.404 0.777**
(0.117) (0.198) (0.264) (0.287) (0.331) (0.362) (0.417) (0.384)
∆dshare x Bank 0.619** 1.406*** 0.353 -0.525 -1.178*** -2.623*** -3.613*** -3.666***
(0.244) (0.359) (1.115) (0.584) (0.416) (0.731) (0.855) (0.891)
R-squared 0.250 0.288 0.320 0.344 0.372 0.400 0.428 0.455
Observations 38946 37249 35616 34003 32439 30893 29362 27803
Panel E. Domestic banks t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6 t+7 t+8
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆dshare -0.0481 -0.0854 -0.747* -0.561 -0.428 -1.048* 0.0115 -0.491
(0.247) (0.327) (0.415) (0.482) (0.527) (0.605) (0.689) (0.715)
∆dshare x Bank -0.181 0.220 1.490 0.300 1.597 2.997* 0.236 2.305
(0.664) (0.912) (1.090) (1.270) (1.455) (1.639) (2.461) (2.148)
R-squared 0.224 0.257 0.292 0.320 0.348 0.379 0.407 0.437
Observations 46841 45319 43724 42082 40401 38770 37179 35524
Panel F. Non-domestic banks t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6 t+7 t+8
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆dshare 0.299 -0.000766 0.184 0.689 0.257 -0.0534 -1.170 -0.306
(0.327) (0.475) (0.577) (0.676) (0.717) (0.797) (0.869) (0.902)
∆dshare x Bank -1.020 -0.537 -2.980** -2.880 1.458 0.793 3.683* 6.409**
(1.116) (1.221) (1.417) (1.804) (2.729) (2.199) (2.115) (3.053)
R-squared 0.281 0.308 0.333 0.354 0.372 0.399 0.428 0.450
Observations 32938 31813 30678 29648 28557 27446 26324 25198
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(Table A5 –continued-) 
  
The table shows how price changes at future horizons conditional on an increase or a decrease in domestic or non-
domestic HH (panels A and B), NFC (panels C and D), Banks (panels E and F), IPF (panels G and H) and MF (panels 
I and J) ownership. The sample period runs from Q1 2009 to Q4 2017. The dependent variable is the future change in 
the price of the stock (in percentage), calculated as the difference in the log of the price per share between quarter t and 
quarter t+k (where k=1,2,…8). We multiply this variable by 100 to read it similarly to a percentage change. ∆dshare is 
defined as share(t)/share(t-1)-1, where share is the ratio between the number of shares held by any holder sector to the 
total number of shares of the firm, expressed in percentage points . Banks is a dummy equal to one for bank stocks and 
zero for NFC stocks. Each panel refers to one holder sector, i.e. HH, NFC, Banks, IPF and MF, considering both the 
domestic and the non-domestic segment (this yields 10 sectors in total). All specifications include firm fixed effects 
and time*issuer sector fixed effects. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses and are clustered at the security 
level:  p < 0.1,  p < 0.05,  p < 0.01. 
Panel G. Domestic IPF t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6 t+7 t+8
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆dshare 0.911** 1.358** 0.853 0.474 0.887 0.829 -0.200 2.077*
(0.397) (0.593) (0.716) (0.842) (0.927) (1.023) (1.081) (1.225)
∆dshare x Bank -0.943 -0.555 0.466 -1.274 -2.512 -0.722 -1.846 -0.416
(1.370) (1.828) (2.692) (2.758) (4.198) (3.793) (4.111) (3.535)
R-squared 0.269 0.300 0.337 0.365 0.392 0.420 0.454 0.483
Observations 37237 35947 34629 33290 31890 30509 29193 27868
Panel H. Non-domestic IPF t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6 t+7 t+8
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆dshare -0.565 -0.584 -1.367 -2.411** -2.880** -3.971*** -3.894** -2.826*
(0.511) (0.778) (0.899) (1.127) (1.246) (1.442) (1.523) (1.639)
∆dshare x Bank -1.000 0.353 -1.461 0.444 -2.332 3.574 4.190 8.614
(2.333) (2.976) (4.207) (6.630) (5.536) (5.008) (5.690) (5.780)
R-squared 0.299 0.326 0.348 0.370 0.393 0.417 0.440 0.467
Observations 31592 30215 28804 27505 26227 24995 23784 22606
Panel I. Domestic MF t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6 t+7 t+8
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆dshare 0.302*** 0.0403 0.184 0.257 0.255 0.285 0.223 -0.0215
(0.0774) (0.113) (0.142) (0.172) (0.200) (0.225) (0.250) (0.276)
∆dshare x Bank -0.151 0.677 0.0213 0.640 1.444 0.763 0.466 1.748
(0.447) (0.604) (0.735) (0.764) (0.993) (1.027) (1.061) (1.347)
R-squared 0.253 0.287 0.322 0.351 0.380 0.407 0.438 0.466
Observations 46804 44983 43176 41401 39655 37942 36260 34545
Panel J. Non-domestic MF t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6 t+7 t+8
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆dshare 0.0798 0.0438 -0.0495 -0.215 -0.461** -0.641*** -0.670** -0.804***
(0.0755) (0.115) (0.157) (0.190) (0.213) (0.244) (0.261) (0.281)
∆dshare x Bank -0.966*** -0.916** -0.799 -1.131 0.328 2.090* 1.539 2.407*
(0.349) (0.448) (0.626) (0.730) (0.923) (1.074) (1.131) (1.450)
R-squared 0.280 0.321 0.352 0.377 0.403 0.433 0.460 0.484
Observations 42184 40472 38781 37143 35504 33907 32308 30712
Controls
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Time x issuer sector FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
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Table A6. Prices after equity issuances and sectorial ownership. Follow-on offerings 
 
 
Dependent variable: change in the log of prices between t and t+k (k=1,2,…,8)
Panel A. Domestic HH t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6 t+7 t+8
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆dshare 0.0169 -0.00315 -0.0570 -0.0402 -0.177* -0.0736 0.0278 0.0110
(0.0430) (0.0685) (0.0823) (0.0956) (0.102) (0.131) (0.142) (0.137)
∆dshare x Bank 0.108 -0.244** -0.625*** -0.740*** -0.560*** -0.910** -1.818*** -1.841***
(0.180) (0.115) (0.139) (0.178) (0.199) (0.404) (0.266) (0.255)
R-squared 0.205 0.191 0.184 0.170 0.192 0.154 0.182 0.168
Observations 1637 1585 1512 1464 1383 1325 1263 1219
Panel B. Non-domestic HH t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6 t+7 t+8
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆dshare 0.00955 0.00776 0.0270 0.0408* 0.0347* 0.0407 0.0640** 0.0639**
(0.00698) (0.0147) (0.0181) (0.0210) (0.0208) (0.0248) (0.0284) (0.0300)
∆dshare x Bank -0.0328 -0.00468 -0.0308 0.00759 0.000202 0.0502 -0.215* 0.0529
(0.0236) (0.0288) (0.0409) (0.0314) (0.0622) (0.0629) (0.118) (0.0753)
R-squared 0.239 0.215 0.197 0.200 0.218 0.200 0.192 0.194
Observations 1702 1662 1579 1533 1456 1409 1347 1299
Panel C. Domestic NFC t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6 t+7 t+8
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆dshare 0.0221* 0.0110 -0.0154 0.00611 0.0181 0.0122 0.0131 0.0179
(0.0117) (0.0194) (0.0226) (0.0239) (0.0231) (0.0297) (0.0276) (0.0349)
∆dshare x Bank -0.132 -0.249 -1.365*** -0.905* -1.308*** -1.002** -4.852*** -4.479***
(0.130) (0.170) (0.461) (0.512) (0.229) (0.497) (0.653) (0.551)
R-squared 0.237 0.211 0.194 0.162 0.191 0.154 0.179 0.158
Observations 1553 1504 1438 1398 1316 1265 1211 1164
Panel D. Non-domestic NFC t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6 t+7 t+8
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆dshare 0.00142 0.000492 0.000195 -0.00508 -0.00547 0.00457 0.00795 0.00629
(0.00308) (0.00458) (0.00558) (0.00698) (0.00772) (0.0163) (0.0182) (0.0172)
∆dshare x Bank 0.00641 0.00865 0.0133 0.0202* 0.00771 0.0291 0.0291 0.00928
(0.00550) (0.00875) (0.00973) (0.0122) (0.0191) (0.0254) (0.0207) (0.0218)
R-squared 0.332 0.327 0.302 0.276 0.287 0.302 0.306 0.290
Observations 1083 1047 990 959 907 879 831 797
Panel E. Domestic banks t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6 t+7 t+8
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆dshare -0.000647 -0.00254 -0.00261 -0.00541 -0.00881** -0.00838* -0.0108* -0.0125**
(0.00154) (0.00227) (0.00425) (0.00345) (0.00438) (0.00462) (0.00619) (0.00575)
∆dshare x Bank -0.00263 -0.0789*** 0.228 0.00462 -0.114 0.569*** 1.412*** 1.572***
(0.0124) (0.0104) (0.293) (0.299) (0.195) (0.0932) (0.185) (0.111)
R-squared 0.272 0.250 0.231 0.208 0.228 0.224 0.243 0.222
Observations 1169 1146 1105 1073 1020 986 949 913
Panel F. Non-domestic banks t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6 t+7 t+8
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆dshare 0.00571* 0.00429 -0.000988 -0.00449 -0.0103 -0.0134 -0.0148 -0.0102
(0.00315) (0.00416) (0.00585) (0.00691) (0.00794) (0.0129) (0.0147) (0.0134)
∆dshare x Bank 0.00494 0.00770 0.00457 0.00386 0.0330** 0.0373* 0.0545*** 0.0760***
(0.00547) (0.00830) (0.0122) (0.0125) (0.0151) (0.0208) (0.0180) (0.0265)
R-squared 0.389 0.370 0.409 0.331 0.314 0.299 0.303 0.332
Observations 862 847 820 800 769 750 719 695
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(Table A6 –continued-) 
 
 
The table shows how price changes in bank stocks at future horizons following a follow-on issuance and conditional 
on an increase or a decrease in domestic or non-domestic HH (panels A and B), NFC (panels C and D), Banks (panels 
E and F), IPF (panels G and H) and MF (panels I and J) ownership. The sample period runs from Q1 2009 to Q4 2017. 
The dependent variable is ∆Price(t+k), where k=1,2,…8, and represents the cumulative change in the log of prices 
since quarter t to quarter t+k, expressed in percentage. We multiply this variable by 100 to read it similarly to a 
percentage change. ∆dshare is defined as share(t)/share(t-1)-1, where share is the ratio between the number of shares 
held by any holder sector to the total number of shares of the firm, expressed in percentage points. Bank is a dummy 
equal to one when the issuer is a bank and equal to zero when the issuer is a NFC. Each panel refers to one holder 
sector, i.e. HH, NFC, Banks, IPF and MF, considering both the domestic and the non-domestic segment (this yields 10 
sectors in total). All specifications include firm fixed effects and time*issuer sector fixed effects. Robust standard errors 
are shown in parentheses and are clustered at the security level:  p < 0.1,  p < 0.05,  p < 0.01. 
  
Panel G. Domestic IPF t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6 t+7 t+8
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆dshare 0.00959 0.00307 0.000731 -0.00773 -0.00957 0.0163 0.00954 0.0310
(0.0115) (0.0142) (0.0157) (0.0194) (0.0236) (0.0447) (0.0531) (0.0567)
∆dshare x Bank -0.123* -0.191** -0.242 -0.558*** -3.493*** -4.999*** 1.958*** 1.672***
(0.0664) (0.0864) (0.171) (0.189) (0.0236) (0.0447) (0.184) (0.128)
R-squared 0.323 0.246 0.216 0.195 0.236 0.218 0.250 0.225
Observations 946 930 889 867 819 798 761 737
Panel H. Non-domestic IPF t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6 t+7 t+8
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆dshare 0.0132 -0.00520 -0.00476 0.00511 -0.0162 -0.0170 -0.0194 0.00319
(0.00967) (0.0177) (0.0170) (0.0178) (0.0254) (0.0347) (0.0362) (0.0421)
∆dshare x Bank -0.0192 -0.0261 -0.126*** -0.0201 -0.650*** 0.158 0.165** -0.813***
(0.0228) (0.0368) (0.0421) (0.0536) (0.187) (0.125) (0.0767) (0.249)
R-squared 0.355 0.350 0.388 0.346 0.335 0.359 0.380 0.431
Observations 870 848 805 779 742 727 695 664
Panel I. Domestic MF t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6 t+7 t+8
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆dshare -0.0119 -0.00770 -0.0158 -0.0101 -0.0310 -0.0265 -0.0689 -0.0869**
(0.0162) (0.0212) (0.0270) (0.0256) (0.0381) (0.0425) (0.0465) (0.0416)
∆dshare x Bank 0.0229 -0.0763 -0.0873** -0.0268 0.990*** 1.135*** 0.832** 1.851***
(0.0936) (0.0533) (0.0412) (0.123) (0.115) (0.330) (0.417) (0.678)
R-squared 0.294 0.271 0.217 0.194 0.212 0.199 0.224 0.222
Observations 1263 1226 1166 1128 1070 1034 991 955
Panel J. Non-domestic MF t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6 t+7 t+8
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆dshare 0.0245* 0.0165 0.0368* 0.0773*** 0.0869** 0.0782** 0.109*** 0.111***
(0.0142) (0.0170) (0.0194) (0.0298) (0.0349) (0.0374) (0.0387) (0.0375)
∆dshare x Bank -0.0768 -0.265** -0.187 -0.413** -0.397 -0.218 -0.338 -0.0358
(0.0653) (0.128) (0.138) (0.191) (0.315) (0.316) (0.341) (0.437)
R-squared 0.326 0.326 0.326 0.320 0.302 0.282 0.325 0.320
Observations 1080 1053 996 963 921 884 840 808
Controls
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Time x issuer sector FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
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Table A7. Future price performance and domestic HH 
 
 
The table shows how price changes in bank stocks at future horizons (panel A) and following a follow-on issuance 
(panel B) conditional on an increase or a decrease in domestic HH ownership. The sample period runs from Q1 2009 
to Q4 2017. The dependent variable is ∆Price(t+k), where k=1,2,…8, and represents the cumulative percentage change 
in prices (rather than the cumulative change in the log of prices) since quarter t to quarter t+k. ∆dshare is defined as 
share(t)/share(t-1)-1, where share is the ratio between the number of shares held by HH to the total number of shares 
of the firm, expressed in percentage points . Bank is a dummy equal to one when the issuer is a bank and equal to zero 
when the issuer is a NFC. All specifications include firm fixed effects and time*issuer sector fixed effects. Robust 
standard errors are shown in parentheses and are clustered at the security level:  p < 0.1,  p < 0.05,  p < 0.01. 
Dependent variable: percentage change prices between t and t+k (k=1,2,…,8)
Panel A. Future price 
changes, all periods
t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6 t+7 t+8
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆dshare 0.0289*** 0.0442*** 0.0519*** 0.0592*** 0.0572*** 0.0723*** 0.0774*** 0.0945***
(0.00435) (0.00708) (0.00914) (0.0107) (0.0118) (0.0136) (0.0142) (0.0163)
∆dshare x Bank -0.00703 -0.0329* -0.0505** -0.0265 -0.0392 -0.0356 0.0148 -0.0212
(0.0143) (0.0188) (0.0206) (0.0237) (0.0280) (0.0371) (0.0499) (0.0455)
R-squared 0.164 0.192 0.227 0.255 0.282 0.308 0.334 0.362
Observations 69141 66314 63474 60707 57906 55245 52639 49981
Panel B. Follow-on issuances t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6 t+7 t+8
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆dshare 0.0112 -0.0238 -0.0678 -0.0999 -0.339*** -0.272** -0.0853 -0.0698
(0.0512) (0.0783) (0.0878) (0.0978) (0.113) (0.132) (0.160) (0.162)
∆dshare x Bank -0.0376 -0.276** -0.470*** -0.439*** -1.881*** -2.965*** -1.437*** -0.468***
(0.168) (0.110) (0.144) (0.144) (0.113) (0.132) (0.160) (0.162)
R-squared 0.210 0.198 0.199 0.165 0.208 0.150 0.191 0.158
Observations 1637 1585 1512 1464 1383 1325 1263 1219
Controls
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Time*issuer sector FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
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The table studies how the holdings of each sector varies following a price change in the stocks. Both in Panel A (OLS 
regressions) and B (seemingly unrelated regression -SUR-) the sample is restricted to observations in which netbuy is 
defined for all investors in the same stock and quarter (common exposures). The sample period runs from Q1 2009 to 
Q4 2017. The dependent variable is netbuy or the (average) quarterly change in stock holdings, measured as the number 
of shares held (expressed in logs) and calculated at the security level. We multiply this variable by 100 to read it 
similarly to a percentage change. Return stands for the lagged return of the stock, or its price change in the previous 
quarter. Bank is a dummy equal to one if the issuer is a bank, and zero if the issuer is a NFC. In columns we collect 
results per holder sector (HH=households or individual investors; NFC=non-financial corporations; Banks are banks; 
IPF=Insurance and Pension Funds; MF=Mutual Funds). All specifications include firm fixed effects, time fixed effects, 
and holder country fixed effects. The p-value of the Breusch-Pagan test for independent equations is reported below 
Panel B and it is highly significant, indicating that the residuals of the five equations (one per holder) are not 
independent (and thus the SUR provides more efficient estimates of standard errors). Robust standard errors are shown 
in parentheses and are clustered at the security level:  p < 0.1,  p < 0.05,  p < 0.01. 
Panel A. OLS HH NFC Banks IPF MF
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Return (in t-1) -6.644*** -2.463* 10.19*** -4.489** 5.163***
(0.901) (1.364) (2.897) (1.993) (1.466)
Return (in t-1) x Bank -6.983** -5.835 -9.697 -6.115 -5.121
(3.214) (3.892) (11.07) (5.317) (4.648)
R-squared 0.102 0.081 0.123 0.083 0.104
Observations 19,865 19,865 19,865 19,865 19,865
Panel B. Seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) HH NFC Banks IPF MF
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Return (in t-1) -6.644*** -2.463* 10.19*** -4.489** 5.163***
(0.779) (1.269) (2.842) (1.745) (1.249)
Return (in t-1) x Bank -6.983*** -5.835 -9.697 -6.115 -5.121
(2.330) (3.796) (8.502) (5.219) (3.737)
R-squared 0.116
Observations 19,865




Holder country FE Y
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All All All All All All All All All
Explanatory variables / subset of 
observations
All
Market cap > 
50  million
Market cap > 
100  million
All
Market cap > 
50  million
Market cap > 
100  million
All
Market cap > 
50  million
Market cap > 
100  million
All
Market cap > 
50  million
Market cap > 
100  million
(1) (2) ´(3) ´(4) ´(5) ´(6) ´(7) ´(8) ´(9) ´(10) ´(11) ´(12)
Return (in t-1) -6.644*** -6.410*** -6.530*** -7.180*** -7.751*** -7.902*** -6.475*** -6.937*** -6.957*** . . .
(0.901) (0.936) (1.000) (1.205) (1.249) (1.329) (1.212) (1.244) (1.327) . . .
Return (in t-1) x DOM -3.685*** -3.043** -3.426*** -5.024*** -4.750*** -5.167*** -4.600*** -4.513*** -5.062***
(1.230) (1.246) (1.286) (1.298) (1.301) (1.348) (1.406) (1.448) (1.506)
Return (in t-1) x Bank -6.983** -7.542** -7.521** 1.940 2.259 2.305 1.767 2.134 2.135 . . .
(3.214) (3.250) (3.437) (5.254) (5.279) (5.444) (5.113) (5.122) (5.299) . . .
Bank x DOM 0.00828 0.00953 -0.151 . . . . . .
(0.827) (0.837) (0.879) . . . . . .
Return (in t-1) x Bank x DOM -8.173* -8.861** -8.482* -8.302* -8.592** -8.304* -13.02*** -12.96*** -12.06***
(4.444) (4.471) (4.585) (4.372) (4.375) (4.525) (4.248) (4.251) (4.319)
R-squared 0.102 0.086 0.086 0.047 0.045 0.046 0.150 0.150 0.150 0.400 0.398 0.399
Observations 19,865 17901 16118 83507 78298 72349 82509 77537 71730 80386 75824 70381
Controls
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y . . . . . .
Time FE Y Y Y Y Y Y . . . . . .
Holder country FE Y Y Y Y Y Y . . . . . .
Domestic holder FE N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm x Time FE N N N N N N N N N Y Y Y
Firm x Holder country FE N N N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y
Time x Holder country FE N N N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y

































The table shows how the holdings of HH varies following a price change in the stocks. In the first three columns, the sample is restricted to 1) domestic holders, and 2) observations in which netbuy 
is defined for all investors in the same stock and quarter (common exposures). In the rest of columns, the sample includes non-domestic holdings, although we get rid of very small exposures (those 
with a total share in the market capitalization of the stock below 0.01%). The sample period runs from Q1 2009 to Q4 2017. The dependent variable is netbuy or the (average) quarterly change in 
stock holdings, measured as the number of shares held (expressed in logs) and calculated at the security level. We multiply this variable by 100 to read it similarly to a percentage change. Return 
stands for the lagged return of the stock, or its price change in the previous quarter. DOM is a dummy equal to one if the holder is domestic (the dummy is equal to zero for non-resident holders). 
Bank is a dummy equal to one if the issuer is a bank, and zero if the issuer is a NFC. All specifications include firm, time and holder country fixed effects. In columns 4-12, we include domestic 
holder fixed effects as well. In some columns, we interact some of these fixed effects (see the bottom of the table). Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses and are clustered at the security 
level:  p < 0.1,  p < 0.05,  p < 0.01. 
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Table A10. Sectorial response to stock price changes. Periods with similar returns 
between bank and NFC stocks vs other periods. Sample of common exposures. 
 
The table shows how the holdings of bank and NFC stocks of HH varies following a price change in these stocks. In 
the first column, the sample is restricted to 1) domestic holders, 2) observations in which netbuy is defined for all 
investors in the same stock and quarter (common exposures), and 3) periods in which the past return of banks and NFC 
are “similar”. For this purpose, we calculate the average lagged returns in NFC and banks stocks for each period. We 
then calculate the difference between these two returns, and obtain the distribution of this new variable. Periods with 
“similar” returns are those in the interquartile range of this distribution. In column 1, the sample includes only domestic 
holdings. In the rest of columns, the sample includes non-domestic holdings as well, although we get rid of very small 
exposures (those with a total share in the market capitalization of the stock below 0.01%). The sample period runs from 
Q1 2009 to Q4 2017. The dependent variable is netbuy or the (average) quarterly change in stock holdings, measured 
as the number of shares held (expressed in logs) and calculated at the security level. We multiply this variable by 100 
to read it similarly to a percentage change. Return stands for the lagged return of the stock, or its price change in the 
previous quarter. DOM is a dummy equal to one if the holder is domestic (the dummy is equal to zero for non-resident 
holders). Bank is a dummy equal to one if the issuer is a bank, and zero if the issuer is a NFC. All specifications include 
firm, time and holder country fixed effects. Columns 2-4 include domestic holder fixed effects as well. In some 
columns, we interact some of these fixed effects (see the bottom of the table). Robust standard errors are shown in 
parentheses and are clustered at the security level:  p < 0.1,  p < 0.05,  p < 0.01. 





Explanatory variables / subset of 
observations
All All All All
(1) ´(2) ´(3) ´(4)
Return (in t-1) -6.200*** -10.22*** -9.981*** .
(1.323) (1.563) (1.586) .
Return (in t-1) x DOM . 1.028 1.698 1.237
. (1.752) (1.826) (2.086)
Return (in t-1) x Bank -11.45* 9.216 8.213 .
(6.496) (7.219) (7.092) .
Bank x DOM . 1.524* . .
. (0.917) . .
Return (in t-1) x Bank x DOM . -15.93** -13.16** -12.99**
. (7.033) (6.539) (6.286)
R-squared 0.162 0.060 0.207 0.434
Observations 10182 44627 43351 42249
Controls
Firm FE Y Y . .
Time FE Y Y . .
Holder country FE Y Y . .
Domestic holder FE N Y Y Y
Firm x Time FE N N N Y
Firm x Holder country FE N N Y Y
Time x Holder country FE N N Y Y
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Table A11. Future price performance and changes in sectorial ownership. Sample 
of common exposures, firms with a market capitalization of over EUR 50 million 
 
  
The table shows how price changes at future horizons conditional on an increase or a decrease in domestic HH 
ownership (Panel A) and following a follow-on issuance (Panel B). The sample period runs from Q1 2009 to Q4 2017. 
The dependent variable is the future change in the price of the stock (in percentage), calculated as the difference in the 
log of the price per share between quarter t and quarter t+k (where k=1,2,…8). We multiply this variable by 100 to read 
it similarly to a percentage change. ∆dshare is defined as share(t)/share(t-1)-1, where share is the ratio between the 
number of shares held by HH to the total number of shares of the firm, expressed in percentage points. The sample of 
NFCs is restricted to observations in which netbuy is defined for all investors in the same stock and quarter (common 
exposures), and to stocks with a market capitalization of over EUR 50 million in at least 33% of observations. All 
specifications include firm fixed effects and time*issuer sector fixed effects. Robust standard errors are shown in 
parentheses and are clustered at the security level:  p < 0.1,  p < 0.05,  p < 0.01. 
 
Dependent variable: change in the log of prices between t and t+k (k=1,2,…,8)
Panel A. Future price 
performance, all periods
t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6 t+7 t+8
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆dshare 0.0278*** 0.0341** 0.0438** 0.0796*** 0.111*** 0.103*** 0.0985*** 0.153***
(0.0104) (0.0155) (0.0183) (0.0215) (0.0224) (0.0284) (0.0317) (0.0290)
∆dshare x Bank -0.00965 -0.0152 -0.0737** -0.0261 -0.117** -0.0652 -0.0134 -0.0898
(0.0277) (0.0239) (0.0344) (0.0494) (0.0456) (0.0480) (0.0817) (0.0755)
R-squared 0.339 0.355 0.376 0.402 0.424 0.443 0.467 0.497
Observations 18721 18126 17532 16926 16264 15597 14953 14296
Panel B. Future price 
performance, after follow-on 
issuances
t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6 t+7 t+8
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆dshare -0.0444 -0.148 -0.172 -0.116 -0.274 -0.287 -0.362 -0.269
(0.0957) (0.140) (0.185) (0.204) (0.194) (0.208) (0.239) (0.290)
∆dshare x Bank 0.169 -0.0986 -0.510** -0.664** -0.464* -1.244** -1.428*** -1.561***
(0.208) (0.171) (0.219) (0.259) (0.265) (0.499) (0.337) (0.369)
R-squared 0.525 0.508 0.495 0.455 0.512 0.624 0.564 0.561
Observations 435 428 409 395 368 357 345 334
Controls
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Time*issuer sector FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
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